NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

AN ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION OF SOME THEORIES OF EVIL: PLOTINUS, AQUINAS AND LEIBNIZ

A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

for the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Field of Philosophy

by

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EVANSTON, ILLINOIS

AUGUST 1959

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the nature and causes of evil by examining some of the major distinguishable treatments of questions centered about these topics. Although the theories to be examined are drawn from the history of philosophy, our interest is not primarily historical.

As for the nature of evil, we shall ask whether it can be fully described in a strictly metaphysical context or whether it must be grounded in an ethics. Also, since many so-called evils can be shown to be merely apparent evils, are there any authentic evils at all? If there are, how are these related to (and distinguished from) the apparent evils?

As for the cause of evil, there seems to be a dilemma. If one vindicates God by making all evils inevitable, all evils become merely apparent evils. This means that love or sympathy is deceitful, at least insofar as it insists that human tragedy is a real evil. But if evils are not considered inevitable, if they are not considered the necessitated results of causes, or if the causes are not themselves considered the necessitated results of anterior causes, a causal account of evils is impossible for it must include a causally inexplicable factor.

Our investigation of some of the treatments of these problems leads first into the theory of evil of Plotinus. Evil is shown to depend on a refusal of an orientation to the One, the neoplatonic Good. Evil is real only when this refusal is free, absolutely unconditioned and causally inexplicable.

In the case of matter there is a quasi refusal of form, order and unity. But this refusal, analogous to evil, is not really evil for it is necessitated by matter's metaphysical function as the passive ground of determinability ab alio, without which there could be nothing but the One. Viewed as a factor in a necessitated metaphysical system, matter is not evil. But viewed as a possible object for moral orientation and emulation, matter epitomizes the passivity, dividedness and infidelity to form and order which characterizes the evil man. Within a necessitated world--neutral in value--men may dedicate themselves to emulation of the One, or to emulating matter, or they may vacillate between these dedications. In early treatises he considers the option to these dedications as a passivity to the contrary attractions of One and of matter. But since determination from without is always considered as necessitated, such determination cannot cause evil for no evil is necessitated. Accordingly, he rejects matter's attraction as a determinant to evil. Consistent with the same principle, he later rejects One's attraction as a determinant to good. Plotinus' conclusion is not merely that he does not know what determines the ego to become good or evil but rather that there cannot possibly be any such determinant beyond the ego itself.

To posit the ego's option as absolutely unconditioned leads to three interrelated difficulties. First, he must have contempt for the blind, vicious fools who seek good and avoid evil amid the material conditions of the world. He has said we should love all men as children of the One, but now he ridicules those who "place their good in another" or have any love except love of the One.

Second, the unconditionedness of option makes it impossible to specify what is to be done in practical affairs. He cannot describe what kind of world men should strive to attain, for the kind of world makes no moral difference.

Third, he cannot say how one effects the orientation to the One, or how a man "lives the life" of such an orientation, beyond the extremely general statement that the good life entails contemplation.

St. Thomas Aquinas, like Plotinus, has a world which is only partially necessitated. The way Thomas distinguishes the necessitated from the non-necessitated enables him not only to divide evils--as Plotinus did--into real and apparent, but further provides a partial solution to two of the difficulties Plotinus left; namely, how some of the events which solicitude for finite beings declares to be evil may really be evil, and how a man can "live" his commitment.

Thomas distinguishes, in every finite being, the substance and the operations. But he adds that the existence of any substance means the totality of operations exerted by the substance. He then distinguishes two areas of being; the subhuman, in which operations are elicited naturally and necessarily from substances, and the intelligent, where operations stem voluntarily from substances.

The merely natural beings are driven to exist through exerting operations aimed at specific, individual, determinate ends. Since these operations are considered as necessitated, their success or failure in attaining their ends must also be considered necessitated. Necessitated failures cannot be evil in the strict sense of the term, but because they resemble human failures they appear to be evil. These Thomas calls the apparent or analogical evils of malum naturae.

It is unnecessary to distinguish interior power and exterior means where both are merely natural, but in the case of voluntary beings, where the interior power is ultimately traceable to an unconditioned, non-natural will, the distinction is important. From it stems a distinction of evils into those which arise from the will and those which occur despite the will. Calling the latter evil seems to threaten the principle that no real evil is necessary, for many such events seem necessitated. Plotinus would urge that Thomas call these mala naturae, but to do so is to trivialize them in a way that outrages a natural solicitude or love among men which Thomas is anxious to preserve. Thomas insists these are real evils, so he then must say they stem from a non-necessitated source. But the only such source capable of evil is man's will. Thomas does not pursue the implication that whenever any man suffers, some--or perhaps all--voluntary agents are guilty. Instead, he falls back on a faith in original sin and posits from it a universal guilt of all men.

The possibility of men inflicting genuine evils on other men allows Thomas to specify the content of good or evil moral acts. Moral good and evil remains essentially orientational, but since men exist only through their acts, the orientation is effected through action rather than contemplation. In place of the plotinian contemplative's vision, we have the Thomistic dynamic being's rules for action. This dissertation does not examine in detail the specific rules or "natural laws." It examines instead the ultimate ground of commitment to, or refusal of, determination according to the laws. And here, as in Plotinus, we find an inexplicable radical freedom; when will is about to posit an act, will alone determines whether it shall or shall not consult the law, which alone can give the act rectitude.

The function of Leibniz in this dissertation is to illustrate a brilliant philosopher and highly competent logician being driven to the conclusion that good and evil are merely apparent as a result of his refusal to concede that there are some events which are not necessitated.

The Theodicy is a herculean labor to give a more than illusory status to good and evil despite the principles that nothing necessary is evil, and that there is a sufficient reason for everything. His critics saw immediately that to make the principle of sufficient reason universal is to make all events necessary and thus to rule out any real evil. Leibniz himself was frank enough--although only in a personal letter to Wedderkopf, which he explicitly requested be kept secret--to admit that evil is purely illusory.

For Leibniz, whether we speak of the whole universe or of any finite substance within it, all operations are elicited necessarily. This is because each substance is defined a priori as that which will produce exactly these and no other operations. Of course, this a priori knowledge is not now given to men, but it is known to God and is in principle knowable by men.

Having said that nothing is inexplicable, Leibniz must deny the theory of Thomas and of Plotinus that genuine evil is of this sort. He must further deny--as Plotinus did--that human tragedy is really evil. And this denial entails a denial of the love that insists that human tragedy is really evil.

When the possibility of guilt, of tragedy and of the love which recognizes tragedy are denied, what possible meaning could "good" have? The word becomes, as Leibniz must have known, merely a synonym for "being."

The dissertation yields no new theory of evil. It simply tends to confirm the principle that no evil is necessary, and it hints that without real, non-necessary evil there can be no love.

CHAPTER II

PLOTINUS' THEORY OF EVIL

Plotinian metaphysics begins with the positing of the One, a unity which transcends all multiplicity, all intelligibility and all being precisely because it constitutes the ground for them. Having posited this, the task of metaphysics is to show how there can be anything other than the One, and how the other is related to the One.

> From such a unity as we have declared the One to be, how does anything come into substantial coexistence, any multiplicity, dyad or number? Why has the primal not remained self-gathered so that there be none of this profusion of the manifold which we observe in existence and yet are compelled to trace to that absolute unity?[1]

The function of the One as the radical ground of all else is expressed as a production of all else by the One. The activity, as it were, of the immobile One in producing is metaphorically described as an emanation.

> What happened then? . . . it must be a circumradiation--produced from the Supreme but from the Supreme unchanging--and may be compared to the brilliant light encircling the sun . . . that unchanging substance.[2]

He goes on to compare the emanative process to the giving off of heat by fire, of cold by snow, of odor by the fragrant and of offspring by mature animals. It is natural that the perfect give off images of itself.[3]

The first "child" of the One is "a unity, though a unity which is the potentiality of all existence . . . it has besides a consciousness . . . of this same potentiality."[4] This is the unity of Being and Intelligibility, the "Nous-Ousia."

Just as the One's unity will be seen to permeate the "manifold which we observe," so will this identity of being and intelligibility be felt everywhere. All later beings will express this identity, in a diminished and particular way, by the fact that their being is their intelligibility.[5] Thus, "Intelligible relations are the very stuff that beings are made of . . . . All intelligible relations, blended together as it were in the unity of some supreme intelligence . . . is the Nous of Plotinus."[6]

If the Nous is to emulate the One which begot it, it too must beget. While it continues to contemplate the One it remains motionless as the One is, but it generates a thought. Since the thought is in motion while the Nous is not,[7] it is differentiated from Nous and forms a separate hypostasis. "The thought of the Divine Mind (i.e., of Nous) must be a sustantial existence; such then is that [Soul, or world-soul] which circles about it."[8]

Just as Nous remained with One while it generated Soul, so Soul is "on the upper level united with it . . . but on the lower level . . . generating in turn an offspring which must lie beneath."[9] "There is from the First Principle to the last of things an outgoing in which each principle retains its own seat while its offshoot takes another rank, a lower."[10] Thus the Soul also generates its inferior which is less of a being and less of a unity than Soul, being the unity within the universality of the cosmos.[11] In this sphere it is through Soul "that all things (are) enchained (in a) sympathy and correspondence, [that] all is one scheme of differentiation, starting from the Firsts and working itself out in a continuous progression of Kinds."[12] The image of herself that the Soul creates is the intelligibility and regularity in the cosmos created by virtue of the "Reason-Principles" (logoi), the laws, and the forms she has within herself.[13]

Each event is occasioned by its appropriate Reason-principle or logos. The events are expressions of the logoi, which in turn are expressions of the Soul. The unity of the Soul--the "One-and-Many"--does not make all this into an absolute unity but into a universe of contraries. "It is a harmony in the sense of a resultant unity built out of contraries, . . . differences unfold themselves, contraries are produced, but all is drawn into one organized system by the unity at the source."[14] Each logos expresses itself in the differentiation of things; "it will create difference in the greatest and not in the least degree; . . . it will be complete only by producing itself not in merely diverse things but in contrary things."[15] The result is not a war between form and matter but a natural conflict among forms. "These powers conflict with their opponent principles, not with their substrata; . . . Heat annuls Cold, and Blackness annuls Whiteness."[16] The order so-created, with "its members everywhere clashing,"[17] and where "things are hindered one by the other,"[18] and where "water extinguishes fire (and so forth) should not astonish us"[19] for "the conflict and destruction that reign among living beings are inevitable."[20] In this universe there "inevitably are formed groups concordant and . . . discordant."[21] The relationships among the lower of these are governed by fate,[22] and "not even a God would have a right to" intervene in the workings of fate, for what that law decrees must be.[23] Fate is a "principle which--acting through seminal reasons [logoi spermatikoi] elaborates all that exists and happens . . . . It is the theory of the most rigid and universal necessity."[24]

In sum, "there is a principle which transcends being; this is the One . . . . Upon the One follows immediately the principle which is at once Being and the Intellectual-Principle (Nous). Third comes the Principle, Soul."[25] These constitute diminishing degrees of unity, "the Primal One [is] a strictly pure unity, and a secondary One which is a One-Many, and a third which is a One-and-Many."[26]

Unity diminishes with each successive level of being but it never entirely disappears, for "it is in virtue of unity that beings are beings."[27] Each plotinian being participates, by its unity, in the non-existent One, and this unity or this participation is the very being of the beings. So much is this so that "being" (on) is said to be the "weak" derivative of "unity" (hen) in both a real and a grammatical sense.[28]

Fitting goodness into this metaphysics of unity is relatively simple. Plotinus accepts the Platonic dictum that the One is the Good.[29] While Plotinus could not predicate goodness of the One because neither the One nor the Good really "is," he does indicate a strict identity between them.[30] From this identification and from the fact that he calls his trinity of unities "the first, the second and the third Good on which all later goods depend,"[31] it appears that all levels of being--and of unity--are at the same time levels of goodness. Furthermore, Plotinus considers the identity of being and goodness on the natural plane so obvious that he uses it in showing the reasonableness of Plato's identification of the One and the Good.[32] Each being in the plotinian universe, then, derives unity, goodness and being from its participation in the One-Good.

Does this characterization of the universe as diminishing degrees of unity, being and goodness imply the converse degrees of disunity, non-being and evil? If the ground of determinacy is good--or rather Good--is the ground of determinability--the indeterminate which receives determination from outside itself--correspondingly evil--or rather the Evil? Plotinus seems to think so:

> That which underlies patterns . . . forms, measures and limits, is put in order by an order foreign to it, having nothing of the good by its own nature . . . this reason discovers to be . . . the absolute evil.[33]

> Given that the Good is not the only existent thing, it is inevitable that, by the outgoing from it or, if the phrase be preferred, the continuous down-going or away-going from it, there should be produced a Last, something after which nothing more can be produced: this will be Evil.
>
> As necessarily as there is Something after the First, so necessarily there is a Last: this Last is Matter, the thing which has no residue of good in it: here is the necessity of Evil.[34]

> The principle is that evil by definition is a falling short in good, and good cannot be at full strength in this Sphere where it is lodged in the alien: [N.B., "the alien" is often used to mean "matter."] the good here is in something else, and in something distinct from the Good, and this something else constitutes the falling short for it is not good. And this is why evil is ineradicable: there is, first, the fact that in relation to this principle of Good, thing will always stand less than thing, and, besides, all things come into being through it (i.e., through the Good) and are what they are by standing away from it.[35]

If "standing away" means simply "being other than," then being evil means simply being less than some good or being in any way "other than" any good. This, of course, means that anything other than the Good can be called evil. It also implies that "a less good has the nature of evil" is a metaphysical principle.

Ever since Leibniz, the "evil" of being less than or other than, some good has been called "metaphysical evil." B. A. G. Fuller attributes this theory to Plotinus, maintaining that emanation should be considered a generation of evils or a descent into evils. This was the Gnostic view and "should have been Plotinus' attitude also."[36]

Nevertheless, there are passages in which "the direction of his teaching is unmistakably against a doctrine of metaphysical evil"[37] and this Fuller calls "the great self-contradiction which in the end must invalidate plotinian theodicy."[38] Plotinus certainly is explicit in his denial of metaphysical evil. He says, "Evil is not in any and every lack; it is in absolute lack . . . mere lack brings merely Not-Goodness."[39] This also is involved when he says, "Evil is not negation or privation (but) a self existent Kind contrary to form."[40]

Plotinus is retaining the notion that matter--the Kind contrary to form--is evil, but with the important qualification that the lack, the negation or determinability implicit in all beings subject to determination is not necessarily evil in them. It is this qualification which leads him to say that, even if emanation be considered as a descent into lack rather than a spread of good, the descent does not make beings necessarily evil. This in turn means that emanation and its hierarchy are not evil. ("Certainly it ((i.e., the emanative descent)) could not be towards evil.")[41]

One should object to this that, if emanation is a descent into matter, and, if matter is evil, then, emanation is a descent into evil. To deny this conclusion is to hold the self-contradiction that Fuller finds in Plotinus. To deny that emanation depends on matter's determinability would require a complete reformulation of the metaphysics; to deny that matter is evil in all senses would seriously damage the ethics. To escape he must show that matter has two meanings. Bréhier inadvertently suggested this solution when he described Plotinus' problem as a result of the confusion of two notions.

> The Greek and Roman religions of the day felt it their duty to preserve the faithful from contact with an impure something . . . . Plotinus identifies evil as a religious principle of the impure with the "matter" of (Aristotelian) philosophy. If this is not being unfaithful to Greek philosophy, at least we must admit that the word "evil" acquires in the hands of Plotinus a new meaning; that is, a rational principle of explanation turns into a religious reality concerning the life of the soul.[42]

If it could be shown that Plotinus did distinguish what Bréhier says he identified, he could say that emanation is a descent into an evil-neutral metaphysical entity posited to explain lack and indeterminacy. There would still remain the problem of explaining the nature of the religious evil and the reasons for calling it matter, but at least Plotinus' metaphysics would no longer appear to force him into a theory of metaphysical evil.

Armstrong does not find the precise identification of which Bréhier speaks, but he finds something very much like it, concerning which he says:

> We must examine shortly the well-known contradiction in Plotinus' account of matter in the world of the senses. He varies between regarding it as a purely negative conception, absolute potency, and as a positively evil, anarchic force with a power of resisting form. The two ideas are often found combined, . . . matter passes most curiously . . . from Aristotelian potency to a positive evil . . . . We may perhaps say that the view of matter as a potency is the one which Plotinus adopts when he is thinking as a pure metaphysician. The other is generally rather rhetorically expressed, and is closely bound up with his passionate conviction that man's soul can only find its true destiny in complete detachment from the material world . . . .[43]

Here too, Plotinus is said to be making the error of confusing the matter of metaphysics with matter as a principle of religious evil or of evil for the soul.

Although Armstrong does not find Plotinus making a precise distinction between these two views of matter, he does open a line of thought which suggests an equivalent distinction. He says that the descent of the soul towards matter is "not exactly a sin . . . (but) to descend deeper than necessary into matter is for Plotinus a sin."[44] This suggests a distinction of descents; thus, there is the necessary descent--the descent entailed in emanation--which is no sin, and the non-necessary--and therefore non-emanatively-entailed--descent which is a sin. To speak of one matter which can either be entered sinlessly and with an entry necessitated by metaphysics, or sinfully and with an entry not so-necessitated is the equivalent of distinguishing matter as it functions in metaphysics and matter as it appears in a non-metaphysical and evil sense.

Inge expressed in terms of a distinction of scales of reality the same notion as Armstrong's distinction of descents. He contrasts the "existential scale" to the "value scale." The former runs from a positive point down to a zero point, but it involves no "minus signs." On the value scale, on the other hand, any point represents to the point above it a minus or an evil because for the latter to adopt the former as a moral object, and "devote to the lower any moral dynamism," is evil. Each "lower" represents evil as a possible source of diversion from the orientation toward the good.[45] Since matter is at the bottom of both scales, matter is both the zero good and the greatest evil. This explains why Plotinus can call matter on the one hand "the really unreal"--_to_ _ontos_ _me_ _on_--and on the other hand "the Absolute evil."

If Inge's distinction of scales finds support in the metaphysics and the evil-theory of Plotinus, then that evil-theory will once for all have been dissociated from the emanative scheme. The things in the world that are evil will not be so precisely because they have been emanated but for moral reasons. This seems to be what Inge has in mind when he separated the soul's emanative role from her becoming evil and makes the latter depend on her choice of ends--or moral objects--rather than on her emanatively-entailed materiality.

> The fault of the soul, whether it be due to pride (tolma)--curiosity, sensuality, or mere forgetfulness of the Father, does not, for Plotinus, consist in exercising the creative activities which are an integral part of the world order, but in treating as ends those constituents of the temporal order which were intended to be instruments.[46]

In the same vein, Inge points out that the immersion in matter, which Plotinus considers evil, and the separation of the soul from the world, which is considered good, are not to be taken literally but as referring to two possible orientations for the soul. "The separation is not spatial . . . we are in heaven whenever we 'in heart and mind thither ascend'; we are 'immersed in matter' whenever we forget God."[47]

Despite these notes towards a distinction which would dissociate the emanative scheme--the existential scale--from the scale of good-and-evil, Inge does not think Plotinus consistently kept evil out of emanation. He says that when "Plotinus speaks of the sojourn of the soul in the lower world, there is want of firmness and consistency in this part of his philosophy."[48] This is because, although the descent is good, to be here is bad. Inge thinks it is bad because the soul, in emanatively descending here "commits two faults, one, and the greater, in 'coming down,' the other 'in entering into bodies.'"[49] Furthermore, Inge finds confusion between the emanative and the good-and-evil scales in that here, on the existential scale or in the world as emanated, "there are many facts and some characters, on which the moral verdict is that it would have been better if they had not come into existence."[50]

Santayana was writing against Fuller when he made certain points which apply equally well to this phase of Inge's work. He said that Plotinus did not and could not regard being here, or the things that are here, as evil. A mystic must regard being here as a condition for his non-identity with God and thus for his opportunity to love Him. Calling this evil indicates a dissatisfaction with being in a position to love God rather than be God and reveals one as "a self-torturing Lucifer unwilling not to be God."[51]

One might argue further against Inge that the "moral verdict" of which he speaks might find support in some moral systems, but a moral system based on mysticism cannot judge so cruelly any of "the children of our Friend." The treatise "Against the Gnostics" seems to have been written expressly to repudiate and censure this very view.

It is true that Inge could find support for his contention, as when Plotinus says, "Anyone who has seen This . . . loves with a veritable love, with sharp desire; all other loves than this he must despise, and disdain all that once seemed fair,"[52] or, "The soul . . . in its longing to be borne Thither, passes over what is lovely here and with one glance . . . dismisses all."[53] However, these are patently the expressions of a home-sick or God-sick mystic who compares this place to That, and Plotinus has told us, in cooler moments, that love of That should not generate contempt for this,[54] and that "no reproach can rightly be brought against this world save only that it is not That,"[55] and that it is an error even to make the comparison that might generate this reproach.[56]

In sum, Inge has suggested a valuable distinction. It is in effect a distinction between the good-and-evil scale and the existential or emanative scale, and it could be used to resolve the contradiction Fuller, Bréhier and Armstrong find. But Inge says Plotinus did not consistently use the distinction. His proof of this is that Plotinus considered certain necessary results of emanation--namely, the soul's being here, and certain "things and characters" qua existent--to be evil. But Plotinus and Santayana both say that, since to consider these evil is inconsistent with mysticism, Plotinus did not consider them evil. We accordingly reject Inge's proof and consider his distinction worthy of fuller examination.

Fuller would consider a search for a distinction between matter as it appears in emanation and matter as the evil to be pointless. The only good that could come of it would be to find out why Plotinus did not consider cogent the reasoning: emanation is a descent into matter; matter is evil; emanation is a descent into evil: all existence is a vile exile from which we can escape only by a divine rescue unmerited by our goodness. Since, according to Fuller, Plotinus rejected these conclusions for temperamental, rather than logical, reasons, we need not seek the double meaning of "matter" which would invalidate the reasoning. ("A natural optimism . . . kept him from this easy and logical conclusion.")[57] But this is no argument against the distinction that would justify theoretically that optimism; this is merely the expression of a preference to consider it "natural" and unjustified.

Bréhier, on the other hand, does offer a reason for not attempting to find a distinction. He says that Plotinus "identifies" the matter into which forms emanate with the matter that is evil. The former is the "raw material," indeterminate in itself, which makes determination by form possible. It is the indeterminate ground of determinability. In a system in which "to be" means "to be determined" this element must appear as non-being or lack. This is why Plotinus can call pure matter "the really unreal"--_to ontos me on_.[58] If Bréhier is right and Plotinus says matter in this sense is evil, "evil" means lack, and plotinian evil means metaphysical evil.

But if Bréhier is right, Plotinus would have to say that indeterminacy is evil, but we find him expressly denying this:

> The indeterminate, and even the class whose very notion implies formlessness, is not to be held in contempt provided only it offers itself to those superior to it and [through them?[59]] to the highest beings.[60]

On the other hand, when there is "a refusal of the Authentic" or when the indeterminate "has shunned true being--_pepheuge to einai to alethes_"--the indeterminate is evil.[61] Thus it is not matter's metaphysical status as the indeterminate that makes it evil but its "refusal" or "shunning" of that which lies above it.

> In a word, when we call matter evil we are right only if we mean that it is not amenable to modification by the Good; but that means simply that it is subject to no modification whatever.[62]

To investigate the nature of the alternative orientations--offering oneself or refusing the Authentic--we must examine the ethical treatises.

The ethics begins with an attempt at formulating a definition of a freedom which can be exercised within his rigidly determinate universe.

> . . . Such forces beating upon us, as it were, from one general cause leave us no resource but to go where they drive . . . . personal action becomes a mere word. That we are the agents does not save our freedom when our action is prescribed by those causes. . . .
>
> No one that sees the implications of this theory can hesitate: unable to halt at such a determinate principle, we seek for other explanations of our action.
>
> What can this other cause be; . . . one that . . . preserves sequence and order in the universe and yet allows ourselves some reality . . . ?
>
> Soul: . . . not merely the Soul of the Universe but, included in it, the Soul of the individual [is] not, itself, a thing sprung like things from life-seeds, but a first-hand cause, bodiless and therefore supreme over itself, free, beyond the reach of kosmic Cause: . . .
>
> Now the environment into which this independent principle enters . . . will be largely led by secondary causes; there will therefore be a compromise; the action of the Soul will be in part guided by this environment while in other matters it will be sovereign, leading the way where it will.
>
> When the soul defers to this environmental influence and acts under that pressure so that what it does is no more than an unreflecting acceptance of stimulus, neither the act or the state can be described as voluntary . . . .
>
> But when the soul holds to its Reason-Principle . . . native to itself, only then can we speak of personal operation, of voluntary act.
>
> To sum [up]: All things and events are foreshown and brought into being by causes; but the causation is of two kinds; there are results originating from the Soul and results due to other causes, those of the environment.

> All that is done of [souls'] own motion in the light of sound reason is the Soul's work, while what is done where they are hindered from their own action is not so much done as suffered. Unwisdom, then, is not due to the Soul, and . . . an act is fated when it is contrary to wisdom.
>
> But all our best is of our own doing, [and when souls are only occasionally good] it is not that they draw this occasional wisdom from outside themselves; simply, they are for the time being unhindered.[63]

Plotinus has a causality, then, which is outside the emanative chain. But it is clear that he will not allow this soul-power to be the cause of evil. If souls do evil it is because they are hindered. The same doctrine reappears in Ennead VI, 8 where he says a soul has free will or "self-disposal" only when it is moving toward the Good. "Soul becomes free when it moves, through [Nous] , towards the Good; what it does in that spirit is its free act; . . ."[64] Continuing the same line of thought, he makes motion away from the Good the very definition of "the involuntary."[65] This notion that a soul, unless involuntarily restrained, will tend naturally toward the Good, indicates that "the evil that holds men down binds them against their will."[66] Holding this view of the soul, he ridicules as self-contradictory the notion that soul can cause evil.

> [If the cause of evil] is a denial of the Good by the Soul, then the Soul produces vice within itself by the operation of its own nature, and is devoid of good and, therefore, Soul though it be, devoid of life; the Soul, if it has no life, is soulless; the Soul is no Soul.

> No; the Soul . . . is not essentially evil: neither is it primally evil nor is the Primal Evil present in it even as an accidental, for the Soul is not wholly apart from the Good.[67]

Of the two classes of causes Plotinus has, he can make neither the cause of evil. If emanative causality is the culprit, the doctrine of emanation must be revised and brought closer to a theory of metaphysical evil. If souls cause evil, the foregoing notes on the nature of souls must be revised. He makes valiant efforts to avoid the horns of this dilemma but they all come to nought.

One of these efforts to avoid the dilemma by finding a non-emanative and non-psychic cause of evil appears in *Ennead* III, 2.

> Souls vary in worth; and the difference is due, among other causes, to an almost initial inequality; it is in reason that, standing to the Reason Principle, as parts, they should be unequal by the fact of becoming separate.[68]

But this view has serious defects. If the inequality itself is evil, then the evil is metaphysical and is caused by emanation. If the inequality is not itself evil, but the inferior souls cause evil, how can these good--though inferior--souls cause evil? In short, either good emanation produced evil souls, or the good souls it produced somehow cause evil.

Plotinus was apparently dissatisfied with this hypothesis himself for he modified it, saying:

> As for the differences among them [i.e., souls] these are due to variation in the bodies entered, or to the accidents of life, or to upbringing, or to . . . temperament, or to all these influences together, or to specific combinations of them.

But since most of these factors lie within the soul's power, at least insofar as the soul can overcome their influence, he concludes:

> In fine all diversity of condition in the lower spheres is determined by the descendent beings themselves.[70]

Another formulation takes its rise from the notion that souls are not "entrained in the kosmic circuit and taking character and condition thence." If a soul's character is not forced upon it by circumstances of its life, its character somehow comes from within. The quality of a soul is determined in large part:

> by the character and mental operations carried over from the conduct of the previous lives. "The life-choice made by a soul has a correspondence"--we read [in Plato] --"with its former lives."[71]

This, of course, is incomplete for one immediately asks what determined the quality, good or bad, of the soul's conduct in the previous lives. Plotinus knew that, fragmentary as it was, the notion would be important in his final theory. He also knew that, before he could begin to formulate a final theory, he had to dispose of the dilemma; namely, that, if the soul can cause evil of its own volition, his doctrine of the goodness of souls falls; but, if the soul does not cause evil--but only has evil forced upon it against its will--then the causes of that evil are the circumstances in which the soul finds itself, circumstances brought about by emanation.

Another hypothesis is that the body that chance allots to the soul,[72] may pervert the soul.

> Still, it will be urged, the incoming idea should have been able to conquer the matter.
>
> The difficulty is that Matter's master cannot remain pure itself except by avoidance of Matter.
>
> Besides, the constitution determines both the desires and their violence so that there are bodies in which the incoming idea cannot hold sway . . . .[73]

This hypothesis makes emanation, at least for some souls, a descent into an evil which they are powerless to overcome. It thus places the blame for evil on emanation. Plotinus discards this theory when he says:

> But what if a man, temperamentally good, happens to enter a disordered body . . . [or a bad man a good body] ?
>
> The answer is that the soul, to whichever side it inclines, has in some varying degree the power of working the forms of the body over to its own temper, since outlying and accidental circumstances cannot overrule the entire decision of a soul . . . . [For] the real determination lies with the Souls, who adapt the allotted conditions to their own peculiar quality.[74]

Still another attempt is made to acquit both emanative and psychic causality of being the cause of evil. All this attempt amounts to is an expression of the philosopher's desire to acquit both forces. He says that souls leave the One and enter what seems to be tacitly considered an evil world neither under their own power nor pushed by the One's outward force.

> The souls go forth neither under compulsion nor under free-will; or at least, freedom, here, is not to be regarded as action upon preference; it is more like such a leap of the nature as moves men to the instinctive desire of sexual union, or, in the case of some, to fine conduct; the motive lies elsewhere than in the reason; . . . , each moves hither or thither at its fixed moment.[75]

But if the third cause implicit here is the cause of evil, Plotinus must explain its nature and show where it fits in with the two forces which up to now have accounted for all aspects of causality. In a sense, Plotinus does this and develops what we consider his final view along lines suggested by the above text. The notion of a cause closely allied to the psychic but not exactly psychic itself plays a large part in the final formulation of the evil-theory.

One way out of this dilemma is to find two senses, or degrees, of soul, such that one phase of soul be essentially Good-oriented, but another phase, while it is sufficiently soul to exert psychic causality, is not pure soul in such a way as to preclude a defection from Good-orientation. It is significant, in the light of this, that very close to the text quoted above, Plotinus refers his reader to "the passage in which we mentioned the secondary and tertiary order [of souls] and laid down that . . . each [soul] ranks according to its operative phase . . . [or]

according to the distinct orientation by which each is, or tends to become, what it looks upon."[76]

Plotinus' ethics begins with his positing three degrees of soul: the Good-oriented or best phase; the combination--to koinon, translated by Mackenna as "the Couplement"--of soul and body; and the soul qua a mere form of the body. In addition to these there is an embryonic concept of an ego capable of inhabiting any one of these three, making it "the operative phase," effecting the orientation appropriate to the phase of soul "most intensely lived," and, accordingly giving the soul a "rank" proportionate to that toward which it is oriented and which it thus "tends to become."

In *Ennead* I, 1, which Porphyry considers the second to last of the treatises, Plotinus gives his finished account of the tripartite soul, a notion which appears in semi-developed form throughout the treatises.

> The Couplement subsists by virtue of the Soul's presence [i.e., the presence of the world-soul] .
>
> This, however, is not to say that the Soul gives itself as it is in itself to form either the Couplement or the body.
>
> No; from the organized body and something else, let us say a light, which the Soul gives forth from itself, it forms a distinct principle, the Animate; and in this Principle are vested Sense-Perception and all the other experiences found to belong to the Animate.
>
> But the "We"? ["We" is the plotinian equivalent for the ego.] How have We Sense-Perception?

> By the fact that We are not separate from the Animate so constituted, even though certainly other and nobler elements go to make up the entire many-sided nature of Man.[77]

This last statement occasions a digression from what we call the spiritual grades of soul, couplement and body. He briefly sketches the three grades of selfhood. There is, first, the "Human-Principle" aspect of the world-soul, "the WE loftily presiding over the Animate." This is followed by the individual personality, the "We" "by which the soul wields single lordship over the Animate." It is in this We that "we have Discursive-Reasoning, Sense-Knowledge and Intellection." Below this is that aspect of the self which is more properly called the "Ours" than the We. This comprises "all that is kin to the lion, all that is of the order of the multiple brute."[78]

In sum, the individual unity that we have is grounded in the "One and Many" that is the world soul. This relationship can also be expressed by saying that at the highest point of human individuality there lies the world-soul itself. This intimate participation in the least member of the divine triad is the ground of our spiritual dimension.

> And towards the [Nous] what is our relation?. . .
>
> This also we possess as the summit of our being . . . in that each personality possesses it entire in the First-Soul. [That is, since the highest point of each personality is the world-soul, it will embrace the Nous as the world-soul embraces Nous.]

> And how do we possess the Divinity?
>
> In that the Divinity is contained in the Intellectual Principle and Authentic-Existence [i.e., in the Nous-Ousia]; and We come third in order after these two, for the We is constituted by a union of the supreme, the undivided Soul--we read--and that Soul which is divided among bodies. For, note, we inevitably think of the Soul, though one and undivided in the All, as being present to bodies in division . . . or rather that it shines into them . . . [or] by giving forth, without any change in itself, images or likenesses of itself . . . .[79]

The most purely spiritual phase of a man--the summit of his being--is a part, or at least an image, of the world soul, and, as such, contains in itself the Nous and the One. If this were the sole element in a man, there could be no moral evil, for:

> That Soul, then, in us, will stand apart from all that can cause any of the evils which man does or suffers.[80]
>
> But it has been observed that the Couplement, too--especially before our emancipation--is a member of this total We, and in fact what the body experiences we say We experience.[81]

There are, then, three aspects to a man; the sinless soul, the Couplement, and the body. The good or evil quality of a man will depend on which of the three levels the ego--or We--chooses to use as a criterion in directing its activities.

> In childhood the main activity is in the Couplement and there is but little irradiation from the higher principles of our being: . . . they work on us only when they stand at the midpoint.
>
> But does not the We include that phase of our being that stands above the mid-point?

> It does, but on condition that we lay hold of it: our entire nature is not ours at all times but only as we direct the mid-point upwards or downwards, or lead some particular phase of our nature from potentiality or native character into act.[82]
>
> . . . all depends on whether we [the We?] ourselves have or have not put ourselves in touch with the Intellectual-Realm either within the [Nous] or within ourselves; for it is possible at once to possess and not to use.[83]

In addition to the sinless soul, which, because it is inflexibly good, could not account for evil, Plotinus now has another psychic entity--the We--which is not so inflexible. This will allow him to speak of the sinless soul, as he has been doing, and also of the evil soul, in the sense of an ego which has chosen "not to use," not to "lay hold of," and not to "put ourselves in touch with," the higher phase of our being.

> Here surely is a contradiction; on the one side the Soul is above all guilt; on the other, we hear of its sin . . . We may take either view at will: they are easily reconciled.
>
> When we tell of the sinless Soul, we make Soul and Essential-Soul one and the same: it is the simple unbroken Unity.
>
> By the Soul subject to sin we indicate a groupment, we include that other, that phase of the Soul which knows all the states and passions: the Soul in this sense is compound, all inclusive: it falls under the conditions of the entire living experience: this compound it is that sins; it is this, and not the other, that pays penalty.[84]

Plotinus can now use the notion of the compound soul or ego as the determinant of one's moral quality without making "sinless soul" guilty of evil. As an observation preliminary to a theory of moral evil, he notes:

> We must also remember that every soul has its second grade and its third, and that, therefore, its expression may take any one of three main forms. But this point must be dealt with here again: the matter requires all possible elucidation.[85]

And in this elucidation he makes clear that it is not mere possession of the second or third grade that makes an ego evil--any more than possession of the first grade makes it good--but it is the ego's use of the first, second or third grade that makes the ego--here called "the I . . . sovereign in choosing, . . . the personality, . . . personal disposition"--good, indifferent, or evil, respectively.

> [Investigating the] cause of this initial personality, [he says:] This question resolves itself into two: are we to make the Creator . . . the cause of moral quality of the individual or does the responsibility lie with the creature? Or is there, perhaps, no responsibility?[86]

He says the responsibility would not be man's "if he were nothing more than a made thing, acting and acted upon according to a fixed nature." But man is, in fact, responsible "for he is no mere thing made to rigid plan: his nature contains a Principle apart and free."

> Men possess, then, a distinctive Principle: but not all men turn to account all that is in their nature; there are men that live by one Principle and men that live by another or, rather, by several others, the least noble. For all these Principles are present even when not acting upon the man . . . .
>
> [How can a principle such as this free principle be said to be present if it doesn't act?]

> First of all, the free Principle is not an absolute possession of the animal Kinds and is not even an absolute possession to all men.
>
> So this Principle is not the only effective force in all men?
>
> There is no reason why it should not be. There are men in whom it alone acts [and there are men in whom other principles are predominant.][87]

Man, then, has both the free principle and some non-free principles working on him. Each man makes one of these principles dominant by living by it.

> Man . . . lives in part under sensation, for he has the organs of sensation, and in large part even by the vegetative principle, for the body grows and propagates: all the graded phases are in a collaboration, but the entire form, man, takes rank by the dominant, and when the life principle leaves the body it is what it is, what it most intensely lived.
>
> This is why we must break away towards the High: we dare not keep ourselves set towards the sensuous principle . . . or towards the merely vegetative . . . ; our life must be pointed towards the Intellective, towards the [Nous], towards God.
>
> [And what does "the dominant" mean? Is this the individual spirit?]
>
> No: the dominant is the Prior of the individual spirit [i.e., that which the spirit "looks towards"]; it presides inoperative while its secondary acts: so that if the acting force is that of men of the sense life, the tutelary Spirit is the Rational Being, while if we live by that Rational Being, our tutelary Spirit is the still higher Being, not directly operative but assenting to the working principle. The words "You shall yourselves choose" are true, then: for by our life we elect our own loftier.
>
> But how does this spirit come to be the determinant of our fate?
>
> It is not that when our life is ended that it conducts

us here or there; it operated during the lifetime . . . .

> . . . the evil-liver loses grade because during his life the active principle of his being took the tilt towards the brute by force of affinity. If, on the contrary, the man is able to follow the leading of his highest Spirit, he rises: he lives that Spirit; that noblest part of himself to which he is being led becomes sovereign in his life: this made his own, he works for the next above until he has attained the height.[88]

The upward and the downward paths are both open to man because "humanity . . . is poised midway between gods and beasts, and inclines now to one order, now to the other; some men grow like to the divine, others to the brute, the greater number stand neutral."[89]

What determines which of these three possible courses a given soul will take? It cannot be determined by a universal system of necessity, for, as we saw above, this would make personal action a mere word. Determinism makes the ego unreal, for according to it, "we are no more agents than our feet are kickers when we use them to kick with. No . . . there must be acts and thoughts that are our own; the good and evil done by each human being must be his own . . ."[90] In the case of souls--or rather egos--which take the downward path, "the blame lies on the Soul exercising its choice. Even a Soul . . . must have its individual movement; it is not [qua ego] abstract spirit; the first step towards animal life has been taken and the conduct will naturally be in keeping with that character . . . ."[91]

Evil, then, "originates in ourselves; it has its causes, no doubt, but we are not forced to it . . . it is done by the man,"[92] which means that it is done with a certain degree of freedom. Evil does not follow as a necessary result of emanation; it stems from man's freedom. A freedom whose exercise can yield a blameworthy choice is totally different from the freedom of the sinless soul, whose freedom--and whose sinlessness--stems from its essential devotion to the Good. Thus, there are two kinds of freedom and these are vested in two different phases of man. The freedom of an unshakeable devotion to the Good belongs to the phase of soul which is an image of, or is united with, the World-soul. The freedom to lay hold of this higher soul and take it as one's tutelary spirit or to refrain from doing so obviously cannot be vested in the higher soul for the notion of a defection on the part of the higher soul from itself or from its devotion to the Good is self-contradictory. Such a soul:

> . . . Soul though it be [is] devoid of life: the Soul, if it has no life, is soulless; the Soul is no Soul.[93]

Besides this, Plotinus has already distinguished the higher soul from the "soul subject to sin" in a passage previously quoted. He seems to have the ego in mind when he describes this fallible phase of soul as "that phase of the soul which knows all the states and passions, . . .

compound . . . it falls under the conditions of the entire living experience: this compound it is that sins . . . ."[94] We may now speak not only of the freedom of the higher soul but also of what we shall call "ego-freedom," and it is the latter that makes evil possible.

We may here take notice of the paradox pointed out by Switalski. Referring to the fact that the plotinian ego can share in the freedom of the higher soul only after it has exercised its own freedom to freely "lay hold of" the higher soul, Switalski notes the "paradoxical formula: the soul has 'liberty' to possess liberty or to be deprived of it." The original "liberty"--or ego-liberty--he says, "does not apply to individual actions but to the general ethical disposition of the soul" to be disposed to liberty or to what Plotinus calls "matter-enslavement."[95]

The paradox itself is easily dissolved when one notes the distinction of freedoms; the proper exercise of ego-freedom is simply a condition for participation in freedom of the higher soul.

In one highly compressed paragraph Plotinus shows that it is up to us, up to the ego, to make either soul or body predominate; that the former makes the ego free with a freedom like that of the higher soul, makes it clean and God-like, while the predominance of body makes one like matter in being bound by the system which governs matter, fate-bound and immersed in material necessity.

> Our task, then, is to work for our liberation from this sphere, severing ourselves from all that has gathered about us; the total man is to be something better than a body ensouled--the bodily element predominating with a trace of soul running through it and a resultant life-course mainly of the body--for in such a combination all is, in fact, bodily. There is another life, emancipated, whose quality is progression towards the higher realm, towards the good and divine, towards that Principle which no one possesses except by deliberate usage but so may appropriate, becoming, each personally, the higher, the beautiful, the Godlike, and living remote [from body] in and by It--unless one choose to go bereaved of that higher Soul and therefore to live fate-bound, no longer profiting, merely by the significance of the sidereal system but becoming as it were a part sunken in it and dragged along with the whole thus adopted.[96]

The options open to the ego are to have the higher soul dominant or to let the body dominate the total man. On the one hand, the ego can "work," make a "deliberate, usage," "appropriate" the higher soul, or, on the other hand, the ego can "choose" to do without it. The former effort makes one God-like, free and remote from matter. The latter makes one matter-like in being fate bound and sunken in the material system.

The notion of "deliberate usage" has appeared earlier as the injunction to "lay hold of," to "direct the midpoint" towards, to "put ourselves in touch with" or to "use" the superior phase of the soul.[97] He often expresses this "usage" of the higher soul as a matter of making the higher soul the dominant force in one's acts, as when he says "there are men who live by this . . . free Principle, . . . there are men in whom it alone acts, . . ."[98] and again when he defines the Sage, the plotinian saint, as:

> One whose act is determined by the higher phase of the soul . . . . The acting force in the Sage is the Intellective Principle of the soul which therefore is itself his presiding spirit or is guided by a presiding spirit of its own, no other than the very Divinity.[99]

Since every "agent absorbs much of the nature of its object,"[100] and since every soul "is, or tends to become, what it looks upon,"[101] Plotinus can describe the process of making the higher soul dominant as the effecting of an orientation toward the higher soul, or an orientation toward that toward which the higher soul is oriented. This is why he can say:

> the soul's true Good is in its devotion to the [Nous], its kin; evil to the soul lies in frequenting strangers. There is no other way for it than to purify itself and so enter into relation with its own; the new phase begins by a new orientation.[102]

And this is why virtue, the means through which the higher "soul enters its good" into "life in the body," is itself an orientation.[103] It is an orientation which determines all the acts of the Sage, but these acts are still free, and the Sage is still responsible for them, because he did initially "will and adopt" that virtue determine them. Similarly, as we shall see later, the acts of the man who "chooses to go bereaved of that higher soul" are still blameworthy, even though they are all dictated by material necessity, because he has chosen to lead the fatebound life.

> [If] we imply that virtue has a freedom and self disposal apart from all act; then we must state what is the reality of the self disposal attributed to virtue as a state or disposition . . . . In what sense, at that, can we hold our own goodness to be our own free act, our fine conduct to be uncompelled? In that we will and adopt, in that this entry of virtue prepares freedom and self disposal, ending our slavery to the masters we have been obeying. If, then, virtue is, as it were, a second [Nous] and heightens the soul to intellectual quality, then, once more, our freedom is found to lie not in act but in Intellectual Principle immune from act . . . . Thus our freedom of act, our self disposal, must be referred not to the doing, not to the external thing done but to the inner activity, to the Intellection, to virtue's own vision.[104]

Any one of three orientations is open to the ego, and the objects of these orientations are available to all men. Thus:

> . . . every soul has its second grade and its third, and . . . therefore its expression may take any one of three main forms.[105]
>
> The "secondary and tertiary souls" of which we hear must be understood in the sense of closer or remoter positions [relative to the One] . . . it is a matter of the degrees or powers of the soul by which our expression is determined--the first degree dominant in the one person, the second, the third in others while, still, all of us contain all the powers.[106]

Accordingly, men are divided into three classes, depending on which of the three orientations they adopt.

> Of men, some enter into life as elements of the

> physical universe, bound to that which is outside themselves; they are victims of a sort of fascination, and are hardly, or not at all, themselves: but others mastering all this--straining, so to speak, by the head towards the higher . . .--preserve still the nobility and the ancient privilege of the soul's essential being.[107]

And this "privilege" means freedom, for--aside from the ego's free act of choosing its orientation--the only free acts are those determined by virtue or the orientation to the higher soul:

> . . . when our soul holds to its [higher soul] , to the guide, pure and detached and native to ~~itself~~, only then can we speak of personal operation, of voluntary act. Things so done may truly be described as our doing, for they have no other source; they are the issue of the unmingled soul, . . . a sovereign . . . not to be overthrown by the tyranny of the desires which, where they can break in, drive and drag, so as to allow of no act of ours, but mere answer to stimulus.[108]

And of these "acts" determined by the forces of the physical universe he says:

> The sorcery of nature is at work in this; to pursue the non-good as a good . . . is to be led unknowing down paths unchosen; and what can we call that but magic?
>
> Alone in immunity from magic is he who, though drawn by the alien parts of his total being, withholds his assent to their standards of worth, recognizing the Good only where his authentic self sees and knows it.[109]

Since only the free can truly act, Plotinus can express the distinction between the free and the non-free as a distinction of the active and the passive. The so-called "acts" of soulless things are really the effects of forces of the physical universe. As such, they are compelled, and incidentally are in theory predictable.[110] On the other hand:

> The ensouled fall into two classes. The one kind has a motion of its own, but haphazard [like the horses of a driverless chariot.] The other class takes in the main a straight path to a set end.
>
> The most valuable of them [i.e., of the classes of ensouled beings] . . . their contribution towards the life of the universe consists in acting, not in being acted upon; others, only feebly equipped for acting, are almost entirely passive; there is an intermediate order whose members [are] effective in many spheres or ways and yet serve also by their passivity.[111]

The three classes of men implicit in the above stand out more distinctly when he says:

> [Some men] have fallen unreservedly into the power of the destiny ruling here: some, yielding betimes, are betimes too their own: [and finally] there are those who, while they accept what must be borne, have the strength of self-mastery in all that is left to their own act; . . . keeping unshakeably true all that is capable of holding itself set towards the divine nature, and leading round by all appropriate means whatsoever is less natively apt.[112]

And that the individual man chooses into which of these three classes he is to fall is made clear when Plotinus follows this by saying, "In fine all diversity of condition in the lower spheres is determined by the descending beings themselves."[113]

The same notion that one determines his own moral quality and his own state of freedom or slavery is evident in the injunction that:

> for ourselves, while whatever in us belongs to the body of the All should be yielded to [the compulsion exerted by the universe], we ought to make sure that we submit only within limits, realizing that the entire man is not thus bound to it . . . .[114]

The refusal to submit, the task of working for our liberation from this sphere, the flight or disengagement of soul from matter, bears a superficial resemblance to the Gnostic Weltflucht from a metaphysically evil world but there are grave differences. The Gnostics used the term literally, meaning by it an after-life in which souls are delivered from this essentially evil world by the power of God. It was this view, plus the significant omission of any mention of virtue, that Plotinus condemned in his treatise "Against the Gnostics."[115]

For Plotinus:

> . . . the precept to "flee hence" does not refer to earth and earthly life. The flight we read of consists not in quitting earth but in living our earth life "with justice and piety in the light of philosophy"; it is vice we are to flee . . .[116]

And such a concept of a world-flight does not imply that the world is evil.

> The quest and will of the Soul are not pointed directly towards freedom from this sphere; the reason which disciplines away our concern about this life has no fundamental quarrel with things of this order; it merely resents their interference; sometimes, even, it must seek them; essentially all the aspiration is not so much away from evil as towards the Soul's own highest and noblest: this attained, all is won and there is rest--and this is the veritably willed state of life.[117]

> Disengagement means simply that the Soul withdraws to its own place. It will hold itself above all passions and affections. [It will avoid all but the] necessary pleasures and . . . activity of the senses, . . . pain, . . . and passionate action.[118]

The fact that "passionate action," action arising from compulsion, cannot be totally avoided in this life does not imply, as the Gnostics seemed to think, that the human condition is necessarily evil. Moral goodness does not require that we withdraw from life but merely that we "discipline away our concern" for it.

> When actions . . . are performed upon sheer necessity with the recollection that the veritable good is elsewhere; this is simply knowledge of need; it is not a bewitchment binding the life to this sphere . . . . It certainly seems reasonable to fit oneself into life rather than to withdraw from it.
>
> When, on the contrary, the agent falls in love with what is good in those actions, and, cheated by the mere track and trace of the Authentic Good, makes them his own, then, in his pursuit of a lower good, he is the victim of magic, . . . misled by the spell of forces pulling toward unreality . . . [he] pursues the non-good as a good . . . [and is] led unknowing down paths unchosen; and what can we call that but magic.[119]

And this is why Plotinus can say at the same time that the world is good and that our task is to escape it.

That the escape means becoming God through virtue is most clearly expressed in the treatise "On Virtue," where he says:

> . . . we must escape hence. But what is this escape? "In attaining likeness to God," we read [in Plato]. And this is explained as "becoming just and holy, living by wisdom," the entire nature grounded in virtue.[120]

The steps in the henotic attainment of likeness to the One constitute a reversal of the steps in the emanative procession of the universe from the One. Inge likens it to an upward current matching the downward one of emanation.

> And by the side of this outward flow of creative energy there is another current which carries all the creatures back towards the source of their being. It is this centripetal movement that directs the active life of all creatures endowed with soul . . . . This aspiration, which slumbers even in unconscious beings, is the mainspring of the moral, intellectual, and aesthetic life of mankind.[121]

And in the process of this ascent a man becomes, by virtue of his looking towards it, an image of each successive degree of goodness leading to the supreme Good. We can expect, then, the ascending man to resemble first the last vestiges of soul, then the world-soul which soul images, then the Nous towards which world-soul looks, and finally the One-Good to which Nous is oriented. And each step can be called becoming good, for:

> To the lowest of things the good is its immediate higher; each step represents the good to what stands lower so long as the movement does not tend awry but advances continuously towards the superior: thus there is a halt at the ultimate, beyond which no ascent is possible: that is the first Good . . . the source of good to the rest of things.
>
> Matter would have Forming-Idea for its good . . . ; body would look to soul . . . ; soul must look to virtue; still higher stands [Nous]; above that again is the principle we call the Primal. Each of these progressive priors must have act upon those minors to which they are, respectively, the good: some will confer order and place, others life, others wisdom and the good life: [Nous] will draw upon the Authentic Good

> which we hold to be coterminous with it . . . taking light from it.[122]

For the man whose values lie in things that are "necessities, not goods" the ascent begins by exercising:

> . . . a double discipline . . . [first] declaring the dishonour of the objects which the soul holds here in honour; the second teaches or recalls to the soul its race and worth.[123]
>
> Anyone not of the strength to lay hold of the first soul . . . must grasp [the human soul] and thence ascend; if even this prove too hard, let him turn to account the sensitive phase, . . . which lies just within the realm of Ideal-Principles.
>
> One may even . . . begin as low as the reproductive soul . . . and thence make the ascent.[124]

Various expressions of the ascent are given, including a passage (reminiscent of Plato's Symposium) wherein the methods by which a metaphysician, a musician and a born lover make the ascent are outlined[125] but the most complete expression is that rendered in terms of virtue.

For Plotinus there are two "orders" of virtue, distinguished on a basis of "from what principles we derive them."[126] Some "spring from contemplative wisdom [while others] from custom or practical discipline." The good of these latter or civic virtues is limited. They aim at likeness to good men rather than to the Good;[127] their major result seems to be merely "the noble serviceableness . . . of practical virtue"[128] rather than the soul's own nobility; they "bear upon particular experiences and acts" and must be universalized by dialectic--"presenting them as Universals and stripped of matter for treatment by the understanding"--before they make one a Sage.[129] Despite these shortcomings the civic virtues instil some slight likeness to the One-Good, for "they ennoble us by setting bound and measure to our desires and to our entire sensibility."

> And, further, these civic virtues--measured and ordered themselves and acting as a principle of measure to the soul . . . --are like to the measure reigning in the over-world and they carry a trace of that highest good in the Supreme: for . . . any participation in Ideal Form produces some corresponding degree of likeness to the formless [because it is source of all form] Being There.[130]

And these particular, humanly good and nobly serviceable virtues are like, and liken their possessor to, "the measure reigning in the over-world" in that both civic virtue and the logoi--the lowest expression of world-soul treated in the passages on emanation--serve to govern the relationships between terrestrial beings as such.

But this image of the logoi generated by civic virtue is transcended by the image man is made into when virtue properly so-called--the four Platonic virtues--comes into play.

> [A soul] would be good, it would be possessed of virtue, if it threw off the body's moods and devoted itself to its own act--
>
> the state of WISDOM and intellection--

> [if it] never allowed the passions of the body to affect it--the virtue of TEMPERANCE--
>
> knew no fear at the parting from the body--the virtue of COURAGE--
>
> and if reason and the Nous ruled--in which state is JUSTICE.
>
> Such a disposition in the soul, become thus intellective and immune to passion, it would not be wrong to call likeness to God.[131]

Letting the Nous rule means being oriented towards it, and, at least in this respect, becoming an image of the world-soul, which is so oriented.

> What form then, does virtue take in one so lofty? [i.e., an image of Soul.] It appears as Wisdom, which consists in the contemplation of all that exists in the [Nous], and as the immediate presence of [Nous] itself . . . .
>
> On this principle, the supreme JUSTICE of the soul is that it directs its act towards the [Nous]; its TEMPERANCE is its inward bending towards the [Nous]; its FORTITUDE is its being impassive in the likeness of that towards which its gaze is set . . . .[132]

Since these very virtues are modes of the world-soul's emulation of the Nous, the man who acquires them is also emulating the Nous. As a result, one becomes the Intellectual Principle and acquires in turn its virtues.

> For, at this height, the man is the very being that came from the Supreme . . . . Entering this sphere, he has associated himself with the reasoning phase of his nature and this he will lead up into likeness with his highest self, as far as earthly mind is capable . . . .[133]

The virtues of the Nous are roughly the same as those of the world-soul, with the exception that the former are oriented towards the One rather than to Nous.[134]

But we must go even beyond this, "we have to fix our gaze above the image and attain likeness to the Supreme Exemplar."[135] The image of Nous, by its Nous-like contemplation of the One, makes itself an image of the One.

> All this accomplished [i.e., having become an image of Nous], it gives up its touring of the realm of sense and settles down in the Intellectual Kosmos and there plies its own peculiar act: it has abandoned all the realm of deceit and falsity, and pastures the soul in the "Meadows of Truth:" it employs the Platonic division to the discernment of the Ideal-Forms, of the Authentic Existence and of the categories of being: it establishes in the light of Intellection, the unity there is in all that issues from these Firsts, until it has traversed the entire intellectual realm: then, resolving the unity into the particulars once more, it returns to the point from which it starts.
>
> Now it rests: instructed and satisfied as to the Being in that sphere, it is no longer busy about many things: it has arrived at Unity and it contemplates.[136]

And this contemplation safe-guards one against the "magic" attraction of all the pseudo-goods:

> Contemplation alone stands untouched by magic; for no man self-gathered falls to a spell; for he is one, and that unity is all he perceives, so that his reason is not beguiled but holds the due course, fashioning its own career and accomplishing its task.[137]

Thus, by contemplation one not only finds the Good but becomes the Good, for:

> To the man in this state what is the Good?
> He himself by what he has and is.
> And the author and principle of what he is and holds is the Supreme, which within Itself is the

> Good but manifests Itself within the human being after this other mode.[138]

When Plotinus considers the classes of men who are not sages he displays a "snobbishness" unbecoming to one who has taken the Gnostics to task for contemning "the children of Our Friend." He says non-sages:

> . . . fall again under two classes, the one reminiscent of virtue and therefore not without touch with good, the other mere populace serving to provide necessaries to the better sort.[139]

And of the three classes he seems to have less respect for the luke-warm middle class than for either extreme. His brief treatment of them begins by citing them as the largest class numerically.

> Humanity is poised midway between gods and beasts, and inclines now to the one order, now to the other; some men grow like to the divine. Others to the brute, the greater number stand neutral.[140]

He implies that this class vacillates between the other two, "yielding [as the lower class] betimes and betimes too their own [as the sage]." He berates them for complaining against the prosperity of their moral inferiors superior to them in the ways of the world and, in an obvious reference to the Christians, he chides them for expecting a personal God to watch out for them or for someone to sacrifice Himself for them.[141] It is interesting to note that Plotinus' contempt for this neutral class was in all probability born of the same consideration that

Christians hold should make men love one another; namely, that they are, at least potentially, images of God. Thus Plotinus says:

> There exists no single human being that does not either potentially or effectively possess this thing which we hold to constitute happiness.[142]

The third class, the downward bound, differ from the sage in several ways. The sage's active or willed life is opposed to the vicious man's passivity in being attracted to the plethora of things that seem good to his test of like and dislike. The vicious man is "pulled in every direction . . . by desire;"[143] he acts by "an unreflecting acceptance of stimulus . . . [or] a compulsion outside ourselves;"[144] he is "sunken in the sidereal system and dragged along with the whole;"[145] he is "under physical compulsions"[146] and "cannot be credited with . . . voluntary act."[147] While the life of the sage "consists in acting, not in being acted upon," the vicious man's acts "are almost wholly passive."[148] The result of the multiplicity of his objects of pursuit[149] is an internal multiplicity in the place of the One-like unity of the sage. This is why the soul of the vicious is said to be "stripping itself of its own determined form . . . becoming reasonless blank darkness."[150] Opposed to the four Platonic virtues of the sage are four vices which so characterize the evil soul that possession of them can be used as a working definition of an evil soul.

> What, then, is the evil soul?
>
> It is, we read [in Plato], the sort that has enslaved itself to that in which what is evil for a soul arises quite naturally. The "evil" is that of the soul's hospitable reception of the forms of unreason:
> 1. the unmeasure, both excess and defect [opposed to justice] from which arise both
> 2. intemperance [opposed to temperance] and
> 3. cowardice [opposed to courage], as well as
> 4. the other soul-evil [opposed to wisdom]--the unwilled passivities, the false opinions and the practice of calling "good" or "evil" the things that are pursued or shunned.[151]

But these differences between a sage and a sinner are all secondary; they all stem from the primary difference, which is that the sage elects to ascend to the One while the sinner, although free--in an ego-freedom sense--does not choose to do so.

Thus the proper moral meaning of evil is the refusal to effect the unifying orientation. And the election of an orientation in either direction must be regarded as unconditioned for the election means precisely the decision to submit to attraction by the One or to the quasi attraction of matter's ways. This means that neither of these forces can influence the election itself.

Now that we have seen the moral use of the term, we are in a position to examine any other senses of "evil" in Plotinus. We find two other meanings, each of which depends on the fundamental moral meaning. There is an analogous sense in which matter can still be called evil because it is the embodiment of the refusal of the unifying orientation. This is merely an analogy because the refusal is not a moral act but a necessity. Plotinus knows this for he says:

> . . . when we call matter evil we are right only if we mean that it is not amenable to modification by the Good; but that means simply that it is subject to no modification whatever.[152]

And this quasi refusal is necessary because:

> . . . only on these terms can it be completely different: once it took any Idea to hearth and home it would become a new thing, for it would cease to be the thing apart, the ground of all else, the receptacle of absolutely any and every form. If there is to be a ceaseless coming into it and going out from it, itself must be unmoved and immune in all the come and go.[153]

To blame or despise matter for having the quality which enables it to perform its peculiar metaphysical function, without which "nothing would exist,"[154] would be as pointless as blaming the Soul for not being Nous or the Nous for not being the One-Good. If matter is evil in its nature as the ground of determinability, then all determinables--and this means all existents, and all things other than the One--are evil qua determinable and Plotinus is reverting to a metaphysical theory of evil which he has explicitly ruled out.

Despite the fact that matter cannot be evil in this metaphysical sense, it remains analogous to evil in a moral sense, for:

> . . . evil is a condition peculiar to matter distressed and to what has come into likeness with matter.[155]
>
> Matter makes evil that which merely looks towards [or is oriented towards] it . . . [it] makes over to its own image whatsoever comes in touch with it; . . .[156]
>
> As, going upward from virtue, we come . . . to the Good, so, going downward from vice, we reach essential evil, . . . and we become evil to the extent of our participation in it.[157]

Any other predication of evil is clearly recognized as stemming from an illusion to which morally evil men are prone. Things and events are apparently evil to the man who uses the immoral criterion of "the test of mere like and dislike."

Those who use this false criterion are most likely to predicate evil of some aspect of the oppositions among things. These are not real evils.

> This devouring of Kind by Kind is necessary as the means to the transmutation of living things which could not keep form forever even though no other killed them; what grievance is it that when they must go their despatch is so planned as to be serviceable to others? . . . what is there so very dreadful in this transformation of living beings one into another?
>
> Surely it is much better so than if they had never existed . . . . Death is nothing terrible . . . to die in a war . . . is but to taste a little beforehand what old age has in store . . . . So for misfortunes that may accompany life, the loss of property, for instance; the loser will see that there was a time when it was not his . . . .
>
> Murders, death . . . the sacking of cities, all must be to us just such a spectacle as the changing scenes of a play. [The grieving, lamenting and complaining] is the doing of a man knowing no more than to live the

> lower and outer life . . . . Those incapable of thinking gravely read gravity into frivolities. [Or, as Fuller translates it,] they who have no conception of real seriousness take trifles seriously and are triflers themselves.[158]

"Trifling" means, in general, the practice of seeking the Good among pleasant experiences. "The good worthy of the name can be no such tasting of the casual; anyone that takes this kind of thing for the good goes away empty, carrying away nothing but an emotion . . . . "[159] Those who consider good what "may reasonably be called a necessity but not a Good"[160] do so because the criterion they use "takes it rise from conditions of the body; lack of food and drink, . . . and the meeting of such needs."[161] Their criterion is founded on the "repugnances, desires, sympathies" of the infra-spiritual aspect of man;[162] it changes in keeping with "desire, . . . the passion urging revenge . . . [and] the needs of the body."[163] Because of its inconstancy and disunity, Plotinus likens it to an ochlocracy of desires as opposed to an organized monarchy of the soul. To live by this is to live passively for, "There can be no such thing as 'willing' the acquirement of necessities . . . [this is] mere recognition of need."[164] Those who adopt this divisive, passive, utterly plastic criterion are said to "name things good or evil not by their true value but by the mere test of like and dislike," a practice which is the mark of "the evil soul."[165]

"The happy man," on the other hand, "has quit all trifling," and has "faith that evil can never touch him."[166] He expects such things as "adverse fortune, . . . death [in] his household [or among his] friends,"[167] "sorrows, illnesses . . . the 'Miseries of Priam' [and] the death of [his] child."[168] He recognizes the possibility of "the ruin of his fatherland," of his being "offered [as] a victim in sacrifice," of being himself, together with "his sons and daughters dragged away into captivity," even of undergoing the torture of "the much-talked-of Bull of Phalaris"--a bull-shaped stove in which victims were roasted alive.[169] He can expect these, yet have faith that evil can never touch him, because these are not evils. "Sore though they be to some natures, they are little to his, nothing dreadful, nursery terrors."[170] Nor are the absences of such things good.

> Anything which, present, has no charm, . . . which when lacking is desired because of the presence of an annoying opposite, may reasonably be called a necessity but not a Good.[171]
>
> Let the earth-bound man be handsome and powerful and rich and so apt to this world that he may rule the entire human race: still there can be no envying him, the fool of such lures.[172]

In short, there are two criteria for measuring good: the test of like and dislike, and the true. Physical events and situations appear as good or evil only to the former criterion. To the "true" criterion these are neither good nor bad but only necessary. But since the relative, unstable, vicious criterion is not the true, its "goods and evils" are only apparent. Thus, to the "true" view there is, in physical events, not only no physical evil, but no moral evil, at least insofar as the "victim" is concerned.

We conclude that there is only one proper concept of evil in the works of Plotinus. It is the unconditioned choice of the orientation to matter which results in disunification of the man. Of the two other uses of the term, one is clearly an illusion stemming from immorality and the other is an analogy--to call matter evil for doing necessarily what would be immoral for a man to do freely.

This manner of speaking, while not illogical, leads to confusion and to at least one grave paradox which recognition of the analogy clears up. The paradox is that Plotinus says that the matter into which we descend in emanation is not evil while the matter, the same matter, from which we ascend in henosis is evil. The solution is that it is not the same matter in the two contexts. In the henotic context matter means determinability plus the embodiment of a refusal to make the henotic ascent, and it is this latter factor that is evil. In the emanative context matter means determinability alone; it cannot mean a refusal to ascend for the moment one begins to discuss the ascent or the refusal he is no longer in an emanative context but rather a henotic. This is why Plotinus refuses to call matter evil in emanative contexts and why he does, by analogy, call it evil in henotic contexts. It is, in short, because the plotinian evil-theory is a theory of moral-evil that all discussion of evil must take place in the henotic or ethical treatises rather than in his emanative or metaphysical ones.

The writer sees no reason why Plotinus could not simply say that the man who is active, self collected, integrated, impassive is better than the man who is the opposite of these characteristics or the man who vacillates from one side to the other. The writer sees no reason why he must characterize these extremes as "likenesses" to a One or to a matter. Plotinus clearly realizes that neither of the objectives exist, that the qualities which constitute subjective good or evil are not in the objectives as they are in the man, (thus, he refuses to call the One virtuous and he realizes that matter is not really vicious, for its "refusal" of good is absolutely necessary), and that neither objective exerts causality determinative of moral character. Indeed, he prefers to leave the determination of moral character to inexplicable ego-freedom rather than to the attraction of One or the drag of matter.

As a result, any thing or event which can be accounted for as a result of One's attraction, the World Soul's logoi spermatikoi or even matter's passivity, is not really evil. Evils must be related to the indescribable "cause" of ego-freedom. This means that all "evils" other than the passive moral orientation chosen by ego are either merely apparent evils or are evil in a merely analogous sense--as matter is "evil" for doing what it would be evil for a man to do. This yields in effect an unusual characterization of genuine evil as that which cannot really be accounted for causally.

Paradoxically, Plotinus' characterizing morality as orientation or likeness to one or another objective robs his moral theory of its objectivity. The only properly moral act is the inexplicable choice of One or matter as an objective. Whenever causes or conditions influencing this choice can be found, the choice itself is inoperative; that is, the choice, properly so called, must be absolutely unconditioned. This demand makes it impossible to specify the objective content of good or evil acts. The solitary sot who harms no one but himself and the brigand who puts cities to the sword are equally evil if equally oriented to passivity. No critique of laws, institutions or societies is possible for the only moral act--the unconditioned choice of orientation--is independent of these objective conditions. Plotinus is happy to be able to say that no one can harm the good man but he refuses to accept the corollary that no one can help the sinner. Plotinus cites exceptions to this corollary; a dissolute man living next door to a sage may be shamed into virtue; a man may be taught to have civic virtues (not morally good in themselves) and thus the accompanying good of some degree of integration. But these are not really exceptions for it can be argued that the moral good concerned does not stem from the passivity of being shamed or the passivity of inculcation but from the action of accepting the integration as a good, an action stemming from ego's radical spontaneity.

CHAPTER III

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS'
THEORY OF EVIL

In the metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas, being is conceived as dynamic; it is an activity in which one must engage in order to be called a being. A being is "that whose act is existence,"[1] or "that to which existence belongs."[2] To be a being does not mean passively to enjoy a status; it means actively to participate in the activity of being. One participates in being in the same way that one participates in a ball game or, to use Thomas' example, in a foot race.[3]

The act of being seems to be performed in two principal ways. There is a first act by which a thing simply exists and possesses substantiality, and there is also an ultimate act by which it uses its reality to perform operations. The first act makes a thing to be simply or absolutely or, as it were, barely. There is a "further actuality by which a thing is said to have being relatively." This is the "complete actuality" or "ultimate perfection" of the thing; it is called the "esse secundum quid" as opposed to the earlier "esse simpliciter."[4] The first act constitutes a hylomorphic substance in which matter is engaged in form. The act which makes substantiality exist is the form and thus, "substance has actual existence through its form."[5]

> The less perfect is always for the sake of the more perfect . . . . Consequently . . . the form, which is the first act, is for the sake of the operation, which is the second act, and thus operation is the end of the creature.[6]

Thus fullness of being over and above the minimum bare existence of the first substantial act lies in the performance of operations. Here is the purpose and perfection open to each existent. For:

> . . . all things would seem, in a way, to be purposeless if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the purpose of everything is its operation.[7]

And,

> . . . everything is for the sake of its operation, since operation is the ultimate perfection of a thing.[8]

And,

> each and every part exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for seeing . . . . Every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection.[9]

Thomas has several terms to refer to the two levels of actuality. He calls them "esse simpliciter" as opposed to "esse secundum quid"; that is, absolute being versus relative being. He also contrasts them as first act, substance or being as opposed to second act, operations, complete actuality, fullness of being, perfection and ultimate act. For uniformity of terminology we will refer to them as substantiality and operation.

Both of these levels of being are good. Referring to Aristotle's "goodness is what all desire,"[10] Thomas says:

> . . . the essence of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable . . . . [But] a thing is desirable only insofar as it is perfect, for all desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it is being; for being is the actuality of every thing . . . . Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness expresses the aspect of desirableness, which being does not express.[11]

Since a being has goodness insofar as it participates in existence and lacks goodness insofar as it participates imperfectly,[12] there must be two levels of goodness corresponding to the two principal levels of participation in existence.

> Now we have said above that good is everything that is appetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being [i.e., substantiality] and its own perfection [i.e., operation], it must be said also that the being and the perfection of any nature is good.[13]

Substantiality does not admit of degrees when it is considered as a minimal concept of being. The degrees of a being's actuality belong rather to its operational actuality than to its substance. The degrees of goodness, on the other hand, are less perfect or actual than the complete goodness which does not admit of degrees within itself. Thus, graded goodness coincides with ungraded (because minimal) being; and ungraded (because perfect) goodness coincides with graded being. This is what Thomas means when he says absolute being (esse simpliciter) is relative good (bonum secundum quid), and relative being (esse secundum quid) is absolute good (bonum simpliciter).

> For since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to potentiality, a thing is, in consequence, said absolutely to have being accordingly as it is distinguished from that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being. Hence it is by its substantial being that everything is said to have being absolutely; but by any further actuality it is said to have being relatively . . . . But goodness expresses perfection . . . something desirable and . . . final. Hence, that which has ultimate perfection is said to be absolutely good, but that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have . . . is not said to be . . . good absolutely but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its first [i.e., substantial] being, a thing is said to be absolutely and to be good relatively [i.e., insofar as it has being]; but viewed in its complete actuality a thing is said to be relatively and to be good absolutely.[14]

In short, substantiality has one level of being and of goodness, and operation has a higher level in both. Further, substantiality exists for, and finds its purpose in, its operations.

It would be interesting to digress here and see how the complete identification of substance with its operation would entail a complete elimination of potentiality in the substance, resulting in a pure act which would be a unity of absolute being and absolute goodness, and to show that this is what Thomas meant by the pure act of "ipsum esse subsistens" or "the subsistent [act] itself of to be."

Since this would require a more detailed exposition of his metaphysics than suits our immediate purpose, we only point to this as a subject for future development. We will have seen enough of Thomas' notions of being and good to provide the background for his theory of evil when we examine the ways in which operations stem from substances.

All operations are originated by their substances either naturally or voluntarily. Natural operations are always conceived to be necessitated. This is because a nature is posited only to account for an observed regularity of operation found to obtain, at least for the most part, in all members of a species. The nature is considered the cause of the necessity assumed to lie behind the regularity.[15] This necessity functions to predetermine natural substances to their ends. Natural agents seem to intend the ends they regularly achieve but irrational natural agents are incapable of literally intending an end, for this is a rational activity.[16] The apparent intention of natural agents, then, is really a predetermination directing it, as it were, from the outside, "as the end is predetermined for the arrow by the archer."[17] Thus, strictly speaking it is incorrect to refer to a natural "agent" as an agent, because "natural beings do not direct themselves to an end, but are directed by a higher agent, being, as it were, moved to the end by another's action, and not by their own."[18] Nature's role of necessarily eliciting operations from the members of those species which are governed by natures will be commented on in greater detail as we examine the distinction between the natural and the voluntary.

Every agent, properly so called, is said to act for or intend an end.[19] "Those which act by intellect act with an intellectual preconception of what they attain by their action."[20] Since an act is voluntary only when there is such a knowledge of the end,[21] and since such knowledge belongs only to rational beings,[22] voluntary acts are limited to rational or intellectual beings. And since all acts other than voluntary are natural and therefore necessitated, "the rational creature alone has dominion over its action."[23]

A particular act is considered determined when it results from the action of a perceived good attracting the appetite of the agent. In this case the so-called agent does not deliberate and does not move itself but rather "is moved to the end."[24]

A particular act which stems from the rational appetite or will is freely chosen, rather than determined, because the object to which will is attracted is the good in general.[25] The will is attracted to good as reason shows it; and since reason deals with the universal, the will's object is universal good or the good absolutely and not this or that particular good.[26] Thus, "the will is determined to the good in general but it is undetermined in respect to particular goods."[27]

In sum, the second level of being and goodness, operations, stems from the first substantial level either naturally and determinately or voluntarily and freely; and the latter is found only in rational creatures.[28]

"Since being is good, evil must be an absence of both good and being."[29]

> Evil indicates the absence of good but not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good can be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good taken negatively is not evil; otherwise it would follow that what does not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil because of not having the good belonging to something else. For instance, a man would be evil because he did not have the swiftness of the roe, or the strength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative sense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called blindness.[30]

This distinction of negative and privative comes from Aristotle's statement that "negation means just the absence of the thing in question, while in privation there is also employed an underlying nature of which the privation is asserted."[31] That is "non-being, understood negatively, does not require a subject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher says, and such a non-being is an evil."[32]

But not just any privation is an evil; "evil . . . is the privation of what is connatural and due to anyone;

for the term evil is used in this sense by all."[33] Or, if any privation is evil, privation itself must be the lack of what is connatural.

> In a substance there is evil through its lacking something natural and due to it. For that a man have not wings is not an evil to him, because it is not natural for him to have them; and again if a man have not fair hair, this is no evil, for although he may have it naturally, it is not due to him. But it is an evil if he have no hands, which are natural and due to him, if he be perfect; and yet it is not an evil to a bird. Now every privation, if we take it properly and strictly, is the lack of something natural and due; and consequently the character of evil is always in a privation thus understood.[34]

The naturally due, the privation of which is evil, always refers to the conditions required for natural operation. Thus:

> . . . not every defect of good is an evil, but only the defect of the good which is naturally due. For the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil in an animal, since it is against the nature of a stone to see.[35]

In a context of the two levels of being and good we find evil as a privation of the good of both kinds.

> Evil, as was said above, is the privation of good, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act, however, is twofold, first and second. The first act is the form and integrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil is also twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form, or of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness is an evil, just as it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the body. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due operation, either because it does not exist or because it has not its due mode and order.[36]

These two evils are related partly in the same way and partly differently in natural acts and in voluntary acts. In both kinds of act, every operational defect presupposes a substantial defect.

> The natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it itself is, unless it is impeded by some exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect in it. Hence evil never follows in the effect unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter as was said above.[37]

"And, the evil which consists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of the agent."[38] For "a defective act results from a defect in the active principle."[39]

In natural acts, since operations stem from substance by a natural necessity, natural necessity requires that the operation be as good as, and no better than, the substance. If nature necessitates that every case of perfect legs means a case of perfect walking, every case of imperfect walking means a case of imperfect legs. The two evils are so closely related that to distinguish one from the other seems to be splitting hairs.

But in the case of voluntary acts, Thomas insists on the distinction. All operational defects in voluntary things are distinguished as "culpa" (fault or guilt) from the substantial defects which are called "poena" (pain or penalty).

> But because good in itself is the object of the will, evil, which is the privation of good, is found in a special way in rational creatures which have a will. [Here, privation of form is called pain or penalty.] But the evil which consists in the subtraction of due operation in voluntary things has the nature of

> a fault; for it is imputed to anyone as a fault if he should fail as regards perfect action, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in voluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.[40]
>
> Rational or intellectual nature is related to good and evil in a special way apart from other creatures; because any other creature is naturally ordered to some particular good but intellectual nature alone apprehends the common rationale itself of good by means of intellect, and it is moved towards good in general by the appetite of the will; and therefore the evil of a rational creature is divided by a sort of special division into guilt and pain . . . .
>
> [There are two perfections] one being form or habit, and a second which is operation. Now to the first perfection, the use of which is operation, can be reduced all that which we use in operating. Thence also is found a double evil. One in the agent himself as he is deprived of form or habit or whatever is necessary for operating; as blindness or curvature of the leg is a certain evil. But the other evil is in the deficient act itself, as we could call limping a kind of evil. Now just as these two happen to be found in other things, so also in the intellectual nature which operates through the will; in whom it is obvious that an inordinate action of will has an aspect of guilt, for from this someone is blamed and rendered culpable, that there is a disordered action done voluntarily. Now there is found in intellectual creatures evil as a privation of form or habit, or of anything else necessary for good operation, either that pertains to the soul or to the body or to exterior possessions; and this kind of evil, according to the judgment of the Catholic faith, must be called penalty.[41]

In voluntary acts the active principle is the will. Any operational defect in a voluntary act, then, must stem from a defect in the will. But if bad voluntary acts stem necessarily from a defect in the will there can be no responsibility for moral evil. No responsibility, that is, unless it can be shown that the defect of will was freely and responsibly chosen by the will. To show this we must examine the workings of will.

Now the will is an appetite, and like any other appetite, it tends toward its object, which is a good grasped by its apprehension. The apprehensive faculty for will is the reason itself. Thus, "good apprehended by the intellectual apprehension is the object of the will."[42] And, "the intellect moves the will as presenting its object to it."[43] Thus all the will has to do is follow reason in its appetitive acts for, "when a thing is desired according to the mode of the intellect and reason, there is no sin in the choice, which is always evil through not being according to right reason."[44] And again:

> . . . the goodness of will consists in not being unruly. Therefore, the goodness of will depends on its being subject to reason . . . the will's object is proposed to it by reason . . . this is its proportionate object . . . the universal good which reason apprehends; a human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due measure . . . and rule . . . . But there are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and homogeneous, viz., the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz., the eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak.[45]

When Thomas speaks as a theologian, he considers nature as an instrument by which God governs natural beings and elicits their operations from them. In a sense, reason also has a providential function in its role of directing the development of operational good from the substantial good of voluntary beings. An evil act is philosophically spoken of as contrary to reason but theologically as contrary to Divine law. In some of the passages we will cite, Thomas used the theological terminology as well as the philosophical. He apologizes for this intrusion of theology in philosophical contexts.[46]

Now since "the goodness of will depends on its being subject to reason,"[47] the defect in will which is presupposed by any defect in a voluntary operation must be a failure of the will to consult reason in regard to the operation.

> Evil never follows in the effect unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from an actually deficient will inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This defect is not a fault; but fault follows upon it from the fact that will acts with this defect.[48]

> Accordingly, then, the will lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the divine law . . . causes the act of sin . . . and the lack of order in the act . . . ; for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of direction in the will . . . . The will in failing to apply the rule of reason or of the divine law is the cause of sin. Now this non-consideration of the rule of reason or of divine law is not evil in itself--being neither a penalty nor a fault--until it is applied towards an act.[49]

Thomas inquires into the nature of this defect of will in the Contra Gentiles, where he reasons to this effect.

If the defect is natural, the will will be guilty of fault in every act and there could be no virtuous acts at all, which is absurd. But if it is a voluntary defect, it is a fault; and this fault can be explained only by a preexistent defect which would be voluntary; but this reasoning leads to infinity. Therefore the defect in will is not natural but voluntary; but the voluntary defect itself is not a fault. Now, since the will is a rational appetite, the proper motive power of the will is the reason itself. Hence, when the will tends to its act, through being moved by the apprehension of the reason presenting to it its proper good, a right action follows. But when the will breaks away at the apprehension of the sensitive power, or even of the reason which presents some good other than its proper good, there follows in the will's act a moral fault.

> Consequently, the sin of action is preceded in the will by a failure of order to reason, and to its proper end: to reason, as when the will, on the sudden apprehension of a sense, tends to a good that is pleasurable to sense; to its due end, as when, by deliberating, the reason arrives at some good which is not good either now or in some particular way, and yet the will tends to that good as though it were its proper good.
>
> Now this failure of order is voluntary, for it is in the will's power to will or not to will. Again, it is in the will's power that the reason actually consider the matter, or cease from considering it, or that it consider this matter or that. Nor is this failure of order a moral evil, for if the reason were to consider nothing, or to consider any good whatever, as yet there is no sin, until the will tends to an undue end; and this itself is an act of the will.[50]

Maritain[51] says the most explicit formulation of this defect is that in the De Malo. Recalling the early distinction between negation, meaning any lack, and privation, meaning lack of what is due, Maritain points out that there is no evil, no absence of a due good, in the will's non-consideration of the rule. This absence is a negation and the will can freely put itself in this condition without evil. But when the will proceeds to an act of choice, the consideration of the rule is due, and this transforms the negation of non-consideration into a real privation. From this privation in the will causing the act there necessarily follows a privation in the act. The will lacks the rule and the act lacks the rectitude due it.

Thomas' expression of this, in the De Malo is:

> Now voluntary things are like natural things in certain ways but not in all ways. For it is obvious that something enjoyable to sense moves the will of an adulterer and points it toward the enjoyment of such a delight as excludes the order of reason and the divine law, which is moral evil. If, therefore, it were this way, that the will necessarily received the impression of the attraction of an enjoyable thing--just as the body necessarily, naturally, receives the impression of an agent--the situation would be entirely the same in voluntary things as in natural things. Now this is not the way it is, because however much an exterior sensible thing attracts, it is still in the will's power to receive it or not. Hence, the cause of the evil, that results from the fact that the will DOES receive it, is not the enjoyable thing but rather the will itself.
>
> [And here is how the will, by a negation it chooses to have within itself, causes acts which have the privation that is moral evil.] If there is a craftsman who has to cut a certain line in the right way according to a certain rule, if he doesn't cut it in a straight line, (which is to cut badly,) this bad cut will be caused by this defect, that the craftsman didn't have a rule or measure. In the same way, enjoyment and

> anything else in human affairs must be measured and ruled following the rule of reason and of divine law; hence the non-use of the rule of reason and the divine law is presupposed in the will before an inordinate choice.
>
> Now there's no need to look for any cause of this non-use of the rule, because the will's liberty itself is enough [to account for it], through which will can act or not act. And this not paying actual attention to the rule--considered in itself--is not an evil, neither a fault nor a punishment, because the soul doesn't have to, nor could it, always actually be paying attention to this kind of rule. Rather, the first element of fault comes from the fact that the will proceeds to a choice of this kind without an actual consideration of the rule. Just as the craftsman, his error doesn't lie in his not always holding his ruler, but in the fact that he starts to cut without holding the ruler. And in the same way, there's no fault of the will in the fact that it isn't paying attention to the rule of reason and divine law, but in the fact that, not having this kind of rule or measure, it proceeds to choose.[52]

Moral evil results from the will's freely causing an act while it freely maintains itself in a condition of not considering the rule which alone can give the act rectitude. This non-consideration can result from the will's attending instead to appeals of senses, as with the adulterer in the passage above; it could also result from the will's preventing reason from weighing the proposed act, as in the Contra Gentiles passage paraphrased at length on page 72, or it could result simply from the will's refusal to be subject to any measure at all, which is the way Thomas explains the sin of the angels, who could not err in reason nor be tempted by senses.[53]

Since the evil of fault is freely done, there is responsibility for it; that is, merit or demerit accrues to voluntary acts and reward or punishment should follow. "A good or evil act deserves praise or blame . . . and retribution [is due the sinner from the injured party, if any, from the society of the injured, from God and perhaps from the sinner himself.]"[54] For, "the order of justice . . . requires that penalty should be dealt out to sinners."[55] And such penalty is always relatively evil; that is, it seems evil to the punished, but it is absolutely good.[56]

So much for the rough sketch of the metaphysics and ethics within which Thomas' theory of evil appears. Let us now examine more closely the three kinds of evil he treats: malum naturae, poena and culpa.

The first, evil of nature, is not fully and literally evil because, since natural beings do not literally "intend" or "desire" their ends, the ends are not literally good. Accordingly, neither lack of conditions, nor, what comes to the same thing, failure of operations, for attaining ends is really evil. That is, since a literal intention is required to make a "good," no determined, non-intentional, operation aims at good. Secondly, deprivation in substance or in operation is not fully evil in natural beings because the deprived goods are not really "due" them.[57]

Nevertheless, there remains an analogous sense in which these deprivations in quasi-agents are evil. Thomas continues to speak of malum naturae because the relation of operation to object in naturals resembles the relation of operation to good in rational beings. But natural evil is always regarded as a merely analogous or apparent evil.

As for the evil of poena or punishment, where an actually just poena is assigned and executed, by a just court for instance, the result is really a good. It is regarded as evil, if at all, only by the condemned man and those who sympathize with him.

So much for the scoundrel; he deserved it, but what of the good man? We cannot call the evils that befall him natural in a trivialising sense because he can--or could if he were whole--intend objectives which are literally good and feel genuine misery at their loss. Are goods not due him? But they are due any good and rational being and their loss is really evil.

There are thorny problems involved in characterising a world of naturally determinate beings and adding to it men capable of conscious evaluation and thus vulnerable to real evil. But these problems are transformed into the classic theodicial problem when faith adds the premise that there is a good and omnipotent God. But if faith sets the problem, as Thomas says, faith also solves it. For:

> . . . the tradition of the faith holds that no harm can befall a rational creature, either in his soul or in his body or any of his exterior things unless

> it is preceded by a sin, either in his person or at least in his nature.[58]

The sin in a man's nature refers to original sin, as a result of which man lost his original justice and became subject to defects.[59] This is the guilt in which all men share precisely because they are men and members of the single human nature which somehow constitutes one man.[60]

More specifically, "beyond all doubt it must be held according to the catholic faith that death and defects of that sort of the present life are the punishment of original sin."[61]

There are then two reasons for refusing to call the evils that befall men natural evils. Evils to men are the real primary analogate to the quasi evils that befall animals, for man alone has genuine intention of genuine good and correspondingly genuine cognizance of evil. Furthermore, evils to men must be regarded--according to the faith in a good God--as punishments or poena.

But faith's reconciliation of a good God and the occurrence of discomfitures to beings capable of recognizing them as evil still has the problem of apparent inequity of distribution of the poena, which should be equally due to all men. This problem can be dealt with either theologically or philosophically. Theologically one holds that the immunity from natural evils was a free gift of God, and that this gift was lost as a result of original sin. It is true that "equal causes have equal effects" but the blanket removal of the natural justice that made men immune to natural evils will not have an equal result in all men, for natural evils affect different men differently.[62]

> When original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is left to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments some men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer, although original sin is equal in all.[63]

> Such defects in those who are born with them, or from which children suffer, are the effects and the punishments of original sin . . . . As for the fact that they are not equally in all, this is due to the diversity of nature which is left to itself, as was stated above.[64]

Now this original justice and its loss due to sin are matters which "must be held according to the catholic faith" but they are not "able to be considered by reason." And this is why "pagan philosophers, Seneca and others" considered death "natural to men, not a punishment."[65]

The unequal distribution of natural evils poses a problem on a different level "on the supposition that all things are subject to divine providence and justice."[66] But the very faith in providence that sets this problem also answers it. If an evil occurs for providential reasons the evil occurs for providential reasons.

Suppose, on the other hand, we reject the theological question and answer and approach the problem philosophically.

We are no longer asking about providence and *poena* but about the reasons natural evils afflict some men more than others. To this naturalistic question Plotinus, for instance, gives a naturalistic answer. If a virtuous sage fights a vicious gladiator, the sage will die. What else could one expect? But when the natural explanation is offered as a complete explanation, the event is no longer considered as evil. Furthermore, to go on asking "why" marks the enquirer as an ignorant "trifler" to Plotinus. When the natural explanation is regarded as complete the evil collapses into the relatively trivial natural evil.

It seems that the evils that befall men can retain their full significance only by being considered the result of the unknown, but moral, causes called providence. Perhaps we shall find in St. Thomas, as we did in Plotinus, that whenever "evil" is meant to have full significance we have entered a moral context. Certainly *culpa* is more of the nature of evil than *poena*.[67]

Central to Thomas' treatment of *culpa* is the notion that there is a reason which exists *par excellence* in God but which has an analogate in every rational being. Morality can be defined as growing in likeness to that Being by positing acts--since we have our being only by positing acts--in accordance with either our proximate guide, human reason, or with the ultimate reason of God.

Again, as in Plotinus, there is difficulty sorting out subjective and objective influences making up the commitment and stemming from it. Thomas will not follow Plotinus' emphasis on the unconditioned spontaneity of the decision for this will make a critique of the effects of acts impossible. But if conditions ab alio determine the commitment, the strictly moral hypostasis of personality or subjectivity is destroyed. We may continue to posit the person as source of acts which happen to accord or disaccord with reason but we cannot posit person as source of the peculiarly moral aspect of the acts--for that aspect depends on the fact that the person, in choosing the act, is choosing rationality. Any act done from reason is moral; only acts done from reason are moral.

Thomas joins Plotinus in rejecting appetite as the criterion of good and evil but he qualifies this rejection by making an analogous sense of good according to which the desiderata of sensuality are called good in the order of sense. This qualification is simultaneous with Thomas' qualified acceptance of the orientation to God as the criterion of good. In Platonic contexts, as for instance in treating a problem raised by St. Augustine, Thomas refers to consulting the rule of reason as a "contemplation and consultation" of "eternal exemplars" by the man's "higher reason."[68] Plotinus could certainly approve of this formulation (with minor terminological changes) and of the implication that it is the "consultation" that ultimately makes the man good, and the lack of consultation that tends to make him evil. But if Thomas left his criterion of good and evil at this point he would have the same two groups of difficulties that Plotinus had. There would be difficulty finding the causes and conditions, if any, affecting the orientation or lack of it, and there would be difficulties in justifying any non-moral use of the term "evil."

The writer does not assert that Thomas qualified his acceptance of the orientation criterion in order to avoid the difficulties; the qualifications stem rather from the dynamism of Thomas' metaphysics. The writer hopes to show that Thomas did not reject or contradict the orientational criterion but that his qualifications of the criterion are more in the nature of additions to it; that the additions are not principles brought in ad hoc to solve difficulties mentioned above but that they stem directly from Thomas' metaphysics, and that the additions do solve some of the difficulties left by Plotinus but heighten the perplexity of the remaining difficulty.

In a universe in which one has being only because one is positing acts or operations, the dedication of a self to the eternal exemplars must take the form of action according to the dictates of the exemplars. Thomas cannot make the goodness of any contingent being depend on any static relationship such as plotinian orientation considered as contemplation. To be good means rather to do good. The eternal exemplars must be translated into laws governing action because it is only in action that a contingent entity has its being. The relationship of a contingent being to good can only be that of a pursuer to the pursued. But to pursue and promote the ends which man apprehends by nature as goods is to follow and discover in action the natural law.[69]

Although placing man in this dynamic context adds rules for action, the rules do not conflict with the plotinian criterion of orientation but merely add to the bare formal structure a content expressed in terms of a demand for action. The essence of culpa remains a failure of orientation although this is expressed as a failure to consult a rule dictated by the eternal exemplars. And, as we have seen, it is this lack of consultation, rather than any effect of the act, that makes an act evil.[70]

Thus in one sense the act demanded is always the act of orientation but it is always this act with a specific content. Now, since it is the consultation of the rule that makes an act good, Thomas can agree with Plotinus that the presence or absence of exterior means or conditions for positing an exterior act has no moral significance. As long as the act is fully willed, and willed to be in accord with the rule, it is good, whether conditions over which the will has no control are present or not; that is, whether the exterior act actually takes place or not. The conditions for the specifically moral aspect of an act can never be beyond the will. The determinants of an act's success or failure in the world are natural, investigable by science and are considered for our purposes as poena when they necessitate failure.

As for the specifically moral conditions, we already have Thomas' assertion that "there's no need to look for any cause of this non-use of the rule, because the will's liberty is enough to account for it."[71]

Thomas makes a probing analysis of the factors influencing the use or non-use of the rule. He investigates "violence,"[72] "fear, concupiscence, ignorance,"[73] "circumstances,"[74] "the devil,"[75] "weakness"[76] and even "original sin"[77] as influencing evil. But in each case, insofar as the factor operates, the specifically moral quality of the act is diminished.

Thomas' theory of evil furnishes the content to the plotinian injunction "to lay hold of or use" the unifying element of soul. It means to translate this element into rules and use them in action. Thomas also clarifies the non-moral sense of evil; it means any failure insofar as it is analogous to the moral failure to act. But Thomas leaves unanswered, and characterizes as unanswerable the question of the conditions influencing the use or non-use of the rule. The causes of _malum naturae_ are clear and investigable by science for they are determinate. The cause of _poena_ is not clear but the faith which calls it _poena_ also holds its cause to be providence and human guilt. The cause of human guilt is in principle unknowable but remains hidden in the human will.

CHAPTER IV

THE THEORY OF EVIL
OF G. W. LEIBNIZ

Leibniz' theory of evil can best be understood against a background of his metaphysics and ethics. We shall not attempt a complete exposition of these aspects of his philosophy but shall present only enough of them to serve as background. For this purpose we can consider the metaphysics as an attempt to account for the facts of action, (considered as analogous to the soul's acts of perception and volition) and of the limits of action. The ethics deals with the same problems in the area of human action. His examination is governed throughout by his

> . . . two great principles, namely, that of identicals or of contradiction, which states that of two contradictory enunciations the one is true and the other false, and that of the sufficient reason, which states that there is no true enunciation whose reason could not be seen by one possessing all the knowledge necessary for its complete understanding.[1]

And from the duality of these principles stems the central distinction dominating his philosophy, that between the necessary, which is knowable a priori, and the determined contingent, which is knowable either a priori (to one who knows all the determinants) or a posteriori.

The fact of action led Leibniz to posit a plurality of substances as its sufficient reason. He says:

> there are numerous particular active beings, since there are numerous actions and passions which are particular and contrary and should not be ascribed to the same subject. And these active beings are none other than individual souls.
>
> It is also known that there are degrees in all things. There is an infinity of degrees between motion . . . and perfect rest, . . . between hardness and perfect fluidity, . . . between God and nothing. Thus there is likewise an infinity of degrees between an active being as great as it can be and pure passivity. It is unreasonable, therefore, to recognize only a single active being, that is a universal spirit, and a single passive one, that is matter.[2]

Whatever else it may be, a substance is essentially active or "active by its own nature."[3] So closely is activity related to substance that Leibniz considers the old maxim "actions belong to substances [*actiones sunt suppositorum*]" a reciprocal proposition--whatever acts is substance, whatever is substance acts.[4]

Now, to belong to a substance activity must stem from within the substance; if the action of a supposed substance stems from another, the instrument "Substance" is really only a mode of the agent substance.[5]

As source of the activity stemming from a substance, he posits an internal law (*lex insita*); and this "law itself which involves a continuous succession . . . in individual things" is the only permanent element in individuals.[6] It is this "law of alteration [which] constitutes the individuality of each particular substance."[7]

The action which is determined by the inner law and which in turn determines--in part--the substance by determining its active modifications,[8] is not bodily motion. Just as each substance is like a soul or ego[9] so all activity is like that of a soul; that is, "something analogous to sense and appetite."[10]

> Furthermore, this is the only thing--namely, perceptions and their changes--that can be found in simple substances. It is in this alone that the internal actions of simple substances can consist.[11]

But the law governing perceptive and appetitive activity is only one side of the entire determinant system of an individual substance. The complete concept of a substance has beside this law of its activity a principle which determines it to make accommodations on the occasion of the activity of other substances.[12] It is this passive element in the concept which accounts for all modifications in the substance for which a reason could not--in principle--be found in the internal law of activity. Passivity marks the limit of activity; but, since activity is the perfection of substance, passivity is the limit of perfection. This is why passivity must be found in every finite substance.[13]

Passivity is considered as an element within the concept of the individual; it determines the limits of the activity of the individual in order to allow the reason a priori for a change in it to be found in another[14] and thus to allow the other to be more perfect.

This accommodation of the passive imperfection of one substance to the active perfection of another does not mean direct influence of the one upon the other; "one particular substance never acts upon another."[15]

> [K]eep in mind that what happens to each is solely the result of its own complete idea or concept, since this idea already includes all the predicates or events and expresses the whole universe . . . .
>
> [But] a substance which has an infinite extension, insofar as it expresses everything, becomes limited because of an element of more or less in the perfection of its expression. It is in this sense, then, that we can think of substances as impeding or limiting each other, and consequently it is in this sense that we can say that they act upon each other and are obliged, so to speak, to adapt themselves to each other . . . . [W]henever anything . . . acts, it improves and enlarges itself in proportion to its action. Therefore, when a change takes place by which a number of substances are affected . . . , I believe it can be said that any substance which thereby passes immediately to a greater degree of perfection or to a more perfect expression exercises its power and acts, while any substance which passes to a lesser degree of perfection shows its weakness and suffers.[16]

But since the action which has degrees of perfection or imperfection is perception:

> The created being is said to act outwardly insofar as it has perfection and to suffer from another insofar as it is imperfect. Thus action is attributed to a monad insofar as it has distinct perceptions, and passion insofar as it has confused ones.
>
> One created being is more perfect than another if one finds in it that which will supply a reason a priori for what happens in the other. And it is because of this that it is said to act upon the other.[17]

In short, action is the perceptive expression of the universe, and the degree of activity is both the degree of perfection and the degree of distinctness of perception. And passivity is the opposing limit of activity, perfection and perception. And the complete concept determines both the action (through the inner law) and the passion of the substance.

This "complete concept of the individual" is to the individual what the universal harmony is to the universe;[18] that is, it determines the individual in relation to every possible predicate,[19] it fixes everything the individual will do or suffer; it fixes the relationship the individual has to every possible event or substance. Since any statement whatsoever about the substance must be either true or false, the substance is determined with respect to every possible predication. And since all predicates are within subjects (_predicatum_ _inest_ _subjecto_),[20] the totality of predicates which constitute the complete concept of the individual lies within the individual substance. This is a fixedness of both active and passive (perceptive) relationships; (making each a living mirror of the universe.)[21]

Leibniz insists that this total determination of the individual substance still leaves it contingent. It is contingent because the non-existence of any finite substance never implies a contradiction.[22] (Nor would the non-existence of the totality of finites imply a contraddiction.)[23] But the fact that the reason for the existence of a finite being cannot be found in its essence does not mean that it exists for no reason, "arbitrarily," or indifferently but rather that its sufficient reason must be sought in another.[24]

Thus the existence of contingent being implies, by way of the principle of sufficient reason, the existence of a necessary being--the traditional a posteriori proof of the existence of God. But, since there would be no contradiction in contingents' being other than they are, there are nonexistent possibles.[25] Therefore, in granting existence to contingent beings, the necessary being is making a selection, and the sufficient reason for the particular selection can only be that the selected combination is the best possible.[26]

But, as Loemker says in his introduction:

> [T]he logical process by which a particular order of events actually comes into existence from the order of possibilities . . . is, of course, infinitely removed from our analyses. But we have a formal analogy to the process in the problem of maxima and minima in calculus, in which optimal and unique principles are determined from among an infinity of ambiguous possibilities by a kind of mathematical economy . . . . The principle of the best possible is, therefore, not merely a pious assumption . . . .[27]

"Since the reason of any existing thing is to be found only in an existing thing,"[28] any formulation Leibniz gives to the derivation of this principle of the best possible will involve the necessary being conferring actuality upon some contingent possibles. The formulations differ only in emphasis of the factors leading to the selection. The theological formulation in the Theodicy has an almost anthropomorphic God searching His intellect (the region of the possibles) to settle upon the best, which He then wills into existence.[29] But even in the Theodicy God's act of selection becomes less emphasized and the combination worthy of selection works itself out.

> One may say that as soon as God has decreed to create something there is a struggle among all the possibles, all of them laying claim to existence, and that those which, being united, produce most reality, most perfection, most significance carry the day.[30]

And a mathematical analogy begins to be seen:

> As in mathematics, when there is no maximum nor minimum, in short, nothing distinguished, everything is done equally, or when that is not possible nothing at all is done: so it may be said likewise in respect of perfect wisdom, which is no less orderly than mathematics, that if there were not the best [optimum] among all possible worlds, God would not have produced any.[31]

In more metaphysical terms, assuming that being is good, he proves the best possible world by showing that this is the maximum quantity of being possible.

> [O]nce it is given that being is superior to not-being, . . . or that possibility must pass into actuality, it follows that . . . there must exist as much as is possible considering the capacity of time and space (that is, of the possible order of existing.)[32]

The mathematical analogy considers each possible as a force tending toward existence, a force which can be opposed only by the opposing force of a possible incompatible with it. The resultant total force will be the sum of all forces minus the vectorial sum of oppositions. The situation is similar to the problem of the catenary--the curve formed by a weighty chain supported at both ends such that the maximum of descent is realized by each point. Leibniz seems to have had this in mind when he wrote:

> . . . when many heavy bodies pull upon each other, the resulting motion is such that the maximum total possible descent is secured. For just as all possibilities tend with equal right to existence in proportion to their reality, so all heavy objects tend to descend with equal right in proportion to their weight. And just as, in the latter case, that motion is produced which involves the greatest possible descent of these weights, so in the former a world is produced in which a maximum production of possible things takes place.[33]

The argument appears even more clearly in a passage cited by Russell:

> Everything possible demands that it should exist, and hence will exist unless something else prevents it, which also demands that it should exist and is incompatible with the former; and hence it follows that that combination of things always exists by which the greatest possible number of things exists.[34]

In the same passage Leibniz admits that "it is as yet unknown to men whence arises the incompossibility of things, or how it can happen that diverse essences are opposed to each other, seeing that all purely positive terms seem to be compatible inter se."[35]

This writer finds this admission incomprehensible for Leibniz has already indicated, in the passages we've seen on activity and passivity, the key to the problem. This is that each substance is determined by its concept to be as perfect or active as it can be within a universe in which activity in one being is always accompanied by a determined passivity or imperfection in other beings. This solution is the one Leibniz works out in the Discourse on Metaphysics. (The puzzle here is partly explained by the fact that the Discourse was written nine years after the probable date of the work cited by Russell.)

In the Discourse he describes the most perfect substances as "those which occupy the smallest volume, that is to say, those which least obstruct each other."[36] But ten paragraphs later he explains the only sense in which substances impede and limit each other, namely by being more perfect than each other.

With the removal of what was apparently the last remaining obstacle--the problem of the nature of incompossibility--Leibniz seems to have been convinced that he had proven a priori the best possible world of which each being was the best possible substance.

> A priori it is obvious from the principles which I have already given that the highest perfection possible is obtained for all things and therefore also for minds.[37]

And he says this in answer to objections based on experience that there is evil.

And again he repeats his belief that an a posteriori examination, an examination based on experience, can neither prove nor disprove the thesis that this is the best of all possible worlds. He says it is ridiculous to adduce experience on this point[38] and that objections founded on appearances or on instances prove nothing against the thesis as long as the premises remain possible.[39] And finally he rules out the examination of particulars of the universal harmony as impossible and therefore incapable of settling the question.[40] Thus he holds that the question of whether this is the best of all possible worlds is capable only of an a priori solution and further that he has arrived at that a priori solution.

Leibniz' ethics depends on the metaphysical principles centering about perfection; the notions that perfection means activity, that imperfection means passivity, that substance means "that which has a principle of action within itself"[41] and that the limit of substance is passivity. Leibniz knows that he must posit substance as a "force that long endures" or he will be subscribing to "a doctrine of most evil repute"--obviously Spinoza's--which would "thrust the cause of evil back into God."[42]

As Windelband says:

> Leibniz' principle of perfection made the unfolding of the content of the individual life and the shaping out of its dimly felt originality, the task of the ethical

> life, in the same degree as his metaphysics asserted the peculiar nature of each individual being in the face of all others.[43]

But if substance means this enduring force, it can only mean the individual character or total of predicates which Leibniz has called the inner law.

> For me nothing is permanent in things except the law itself which involves a continuous succession and which corresponds, in individual things, to that law which determines the whole world.[44]

And if "individuality" means "being," as it should in a system where "to be determinate" is the equivalent of "to be," the same notion is repeated when he writes, "The law of alteration constitutes the individuality of each particular substance."[45]

It is, of course, impossible to specify the law of any individual man but in general the activity which is perfection stems from will and intellect. "Souls act according to the laws of final causes through their appetitions, ends and means."[46] And as for imperfection, "It is merely a question of not willing, and God could not grant an easier and juster condition."[47]

The apparent alternatives, then, are to be active and perfect through will or to be passive and imperfect by not willing. One may have one's acts determined by final causes and thereby enter "a kind of society with God" and live as His children, or one may be determined by efficient causes and be related to God only as a machine is to its inventor.[48]

The fact that ". . . every real substance must be the real immediate cause of all its actions and of its internal passions"[49] applies to the moral realm as well as the metaphysical would seem to indicate that the substance has some kind of choice. One expects again the paradoxical plotinian formulation of a will which elects to will or not to will, or the Thomistic formulation where the single will is free to consult or not the rule of reason when it posits an act.

In place of these, Leibniz accounts for the imperfection or passivity by characterizing it as "aboriginal." He cites the "original imperfection of creatures"[50] or "the aboriginal limitation of things"[51] as the source of evils which themselves are merely the same sort of limitation, imperfection or passivity. This is quite different from Thomas' characterization (and justification) of "poena" as dependent on a faith in the doctrines of original sin and divine providence for, although Leibniz apparently believes in original sin, he explicitly excludes it from his account of evils. (This exclusion of original sin, incidentally, prohibits distinguishing poena from malum naturae.)

> For it is not only after man's fall from innocence that original sin has got hold of the soul; even before, there was an original limitation or imperfection

> connatural to all creatures, which makes them capable of sin or failure.[52]

And the same notion is repeated in the Theodicy, where, seeking "the source of evil," Leibniz says, "it must be sought in the ideal nature of the creature, insofar as this nature is contained in the eternal verities . . . ; there is an original imperfection in the creature before sin, because the creature is limited in its essence; whence issues that it cannot know all, and that it can deceive itself and commit other errors."[53] Commenting on this text, Russell says, "Thus physical and moral evil both depend upon metaphysical evil, i.e., upon imperfection or limitation."[54] And the generation of evils from original limitations is the dominant note, discussed at length, in the Theodicy's concluding paragraphs.[55]

Leibniz gives two concrete instances of the way moral evil stems from original limitation, and in each case the original limitation is traced back to a requirement of the harmony of the universe. The closing pages of the Theodicy recount beautifully and dramatically the myth of Sextus Tarquinius. When Tarquinius' future--involving heinous crimes he would commit as Emperor of Rome--is shown him he complains to the gods; offered a second future of virtuous deeds but no crown, he freely chooses what had been originally decreed. Pressing the allegory further, a servitor of the gods asks why Tarquinius had to have such a character as compelled him freely to choose the evil future. He is shown several possible worlds involving virtuous Tarquinius, but when he is shown the actual world plan, involving the real and vicious Tarquinius, he falls on his knees out of admiration for the best of all possible worlds.[56]

And in a daringly frank letter to Magnus Wedderkopf he says:

> Pilate is condemned. Why? Because he lacks faith. Why does he lack it? Because he lacks the will to attention. Why this? Because he has not understood . . . . Why . . . ? Because the causes of understanding were lacking. For it is necessary to refer everything to some reason . . . . or it must be admitted that something can exist without a sufficient reason . . . .
>
> . . . .
>
> What, therefore, is the ultimate reason for the divine will? The divine intellect . . . .
>
> . . . .
>
> What then is the reason for the divine intellect? The harmony of things. What the reason for the harmony of things? Nothing.[57]

Thus moral evil depends on metaphysical evil, which in turn depends on the harmony. On this account, Russell's interpretation that all evil, for Leibniz, is reduced to metaphysical evil[58] seems well justified. Accordingly, when Leibniz divides evils into metaphysical, physical and moral,[59] he is merely pointing out that metaphysical evil can be considered as such, as suffering or as sin.

And the fact that evil can befall sentient beings and can be done by moral beings does not threaten the position that this is the best of all possible worlds, for:

> a priori it is obvious from the principles which I have already given that the highest perfection possible is obtained for all things and therefore also for minds.[60]

Speaking specifically to the point of physical evil (although the remarks apply equally well to moral or metaphysical evil) he says:

> . . . each thing has in it, or will have, as much perfection as it is capable of claiming in proportion to what it already has, without doing violence to other things. But, since pleasure is nothing but the feeling of an increase of perfection, it follows that God will give all creatures as much pleasure as they are capable of, so that those who are reasonable find themselves as happy as possible . . . .[61]

As a result, "all things are good for him who believes, who loves God, who trusts in God. All things are good, not merely in general but also in particular, to whoever understands this."[62]

And finally Leibniz admits, though privately, the corollary to the above; evil is merely an illusion stemming from our blindness. Absolutely considered, there is no evil at all.

> Therefore nothing is to be considered absolutely evil; otherwise God would not be supremely wise in grasping it or supremely powerful in eliminating it. I have no doubt that this was the opinion of Augustine. Sins are evil, not absolutely, not to the world, not to God--for otherwise he would not permit them--but only to the sinner. God hates sins, not in the sense that he cannot bear the sight of them as we cannot bear the sight of things we detest--otherwise he would eliminate them--but in the sense that he punishes them. Sins are good, that is, harmonious, taken

> along with their punishment or expiation. For there is no harmony except through contraries.
>
> But this is said to you; I should not like to have it get abroad. For not even the most accurate remarks are understood by everyone.[63]

Objections from many quarters have been brought against Leibniz' theory of good and evil. The arguments for the existence of the best possible world all depend on proving the existence of a good, omnipotent and omniscient God.

Loemker objects that, since Leibniz failed to prove such a God, his a priori system collapses to the "assertion that perfection exists and that the rest of his principles follow from it."[64] As a result, Loemker says, Leibniz resorted to an a posteriori attempt to prove God from the observed universal harmony. But such an attempt seems doomed from the outset to fail, for the only way Leibniz can meet empirically grounded attacks on the harmony is by an a priori demonstration that the harmony is a fact.

Höffding also points out that Leibniz' proof of God's existence must ultimately be considered a posteriori but Höffding does not seem to realize the repercussions this shift to a posteriori considerations must have on the theory of harmony and of the best possible world.[65]

But even if Leibniz could prove his God to exist and even if he could prove that divine wisdom is as orderly as mathematics and therefore must produce a maximally determinate, or best possible, world, evil in such a world should then be merely apparent. He should agree with Spinoza that "if the human mind had none but adequate ideas it would form no notion of evil."[66] The letter to Wedderkopf indicates this was Leibniz' view but many of his published works gave the impression that he believed in an absolute--not apparent--evil. Russell accuses Leibniz of dishonesty on this score.[67] Meyer accepts, more sympathetically, that for Leibniz "there is no sin, only lack of spirit--in brief there is no radical evil."[68]

Joseph reluctantly agrees that there is some subterfuge here. If this is the best of all possible worlds, all capacities for perfection should be realized--as Leibniz says they are--but this would yield Spinozistic determinism --which Leibniz denies. Joseph objects that Leibniz never explains what a non-actual possible means, and he adds, "It is by using this phrase so freely that he seems to have solved so much: yet in it he has only, I think, put the difficulty under cover."[69]

Closely related to this objection is the oldest criticism of all; this is Arnauld's criticism that Leibniz' fatalism destroys freedom or responsibility and thus allows no moral evil.[70] On the same point Carr says, "If evil be necessary, then necessary evil is not evil but good."[71] And Russell makes the same objection.[72] But Leibniz considers that this objection has been forestalled by his distinction of what is metaphysically necessitated from what is only morally determinate and thus still free. The function of the distinction is to make the agent responsible for any event which stems from his character. The freedom involved is a remarkably Hobbesian notion according to which any act is free when no coercion from the outside has forced one to it. Thus, although the harmony is responsible for the existence of despicable characters, the latter are responsible for the despicable acts freely stemming from their being. Needless to say, this explanation did not satisfy any of the critics mentioned above. That a despicable character contributes to the best of all possible worlds may have satisfied the servitor of the gods mentioned in the *Theodicy* but it could hardly be accepted by a Tarquinius who knew he was a man who would freely choose eternal damnation. It would appear that the only point of view to which the world is good is *sub specie aeternitatis*.

But is the universe good even in this sense? The writer is not repeating Höffding's objection that, "Leibniz overlooks and cannot prove that, even if this is the best possible world, it is good enough to be realized."[73] The question is not how can there be evil in the best possible world but rather in what possible sense can there be either good or evil in a maximally determinate world.

At first glance it would seem that Leibniz could explain the goodness of being as Thomas did; there are substances which generate acts and by their acts are part of the world; substance acts to exist so existence is good qua object of act. But no, we find that the substance is the action, the action is the substance, for Leibniz. The only enduring element in any being is the law of its acts and passions. But if we cannot distinguish substance from existence, how can we say existence is good qua desired by substance?

This same difference between Thomas and Leibniz could be expressed this way. For Thomas every created being has at best a perilous grip on existence; existence is more precious because it is shot through with risk, never grasped and possessed securely but enjoyed through fleeting instants filled with a radical contingency. But for Leibniz there is no risk nor peril. Every being receives the existence it merits.

In short, if every essence is a driving force, and if the very force is the existence proportioned to the essence, there is not sufficient distinction between essence and existence to allow existence to be good as that which essence drives toward. Since Leibniz' ethics and his notion of metaphysical good depend on existence being the good in this sense, failure to distinguish essence from existence makes it impossible for Leibniz to assign any meaning to good or evil.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

Each of the philosophers considered here takes as a general definition of evil anything which impedes any being in performing its characteristic act. This is so whether the act be considered, with Plotinus, as effecting some sort of orientation toward the principle of unity, or, with Aquinas, as the acts conformable to nature (or the acts by which the substance does its act of existing) or, with Leibniz, the exertion of force which is identified with the being of the agent substance.

Each of the three, moreover, wants to trace the relations between evil and causality or sufficient reason. This is partly because the knowledge they sought was knowledge through causes and partly because each undertook the theodicist's task of justifying God by showing that evils are somehow necessary.

But as each of these philosophers brings evils under a causal order, some of the impediments to beings pursuing their acts are seen to be justifiable and therefore not really evil. Thus, one must either declare that all events are justifiable by sufficient reason and there is no real evil, or that some events have no sufficient reason but remain radically absurd and really evil. To posit the latter does not mean to assert events can occur with no agent cause whatsoever but rather that the agent can act with no sufficient reason for his act.

Two of the three posit agents capable of the real evil of acting without sufficient reason. These two then distinguish the real evils from apparent evils or situations analogous to real evil. The third--Leibniz--assumes that there must be sufficient reason for every act and therefore a kind of justification which can be seen by anyone who understands the total situation. Thence he concludes all evils are merely apparent.

Each of the thinkers who distinguish real and apparent evil has his own criterion for these. In both cases the criterion depends on the meaning he has for good.

For Plotinus good is the One, primarily, and secondarily anything that resembles it. Each being is good to the extent that it has the form and order given it by the necessity that rules here in the name of the World Soul. But man is partly free of this necessity, free to make the henotic ascent. A second kind of causality is posited as the attractive force of the One or, what comes to the same thing, soul's essential dedication to One. Those who are dedicated to One are free, good and virtuous; those who refuse are fate bound, evil, vicious. But in order that man be responsible for his own good or evil Plotinus posits an ego-freedom which must be unconditioned in making its choice. His conviction that ego-freedom is uninfluenced by material considerations appears throughout his works, which gives many passages an appearance of Stoicism. And, at least in his final treatise, he expresses the conviction that the election cannot be influenced by the One's attraction; the movement must come radically from the man. The fact that the election, good or bad, must be unconditioned results in certain embarrassments. First, it makes impossible any moral critique of societies. One can say that necessity has given this society more or less form and order than that society, but this is not a moral critique. Second, since the morally good act is simply to effect the orientation to the One, there are no criteria for particular moral acts. As a result, Plotinus cannot explain how ego is to live the life of soul; that is he cannot explain what kind of behavior is enjoined by the orientation.

Over against this real evil of ego's unconditioned refusal, Plotinus sets two apparent evils. What might be called genuine apparent evil is evident in a non-moral refusal of form. This occurs constantly in the decay of material things. It provides an analogous sense in which matter can be called pure evil in that it does by nature what would be evil for a man to do freely; that is, to refuse form and order.

The other apparent evil appears only to the foolish "triflers." A "trifler," using his "test of like and dislike," falsely considers that material conditions can be good or evil for a man. They fail to see that man's good is the Good, and that the Good is reached by the unconditioned act of orientation. Plotinus considers them foolish, contemptible, even vicious. To the true criterion of good and evil, he says, wealth and success or torture and death are illusory goods and "nursery-terror" (bogeyman) evils.

For Thomas the distinction of real and apparent evils depends, as it did in Plotinus, on the meaning assigned to "good." When good is considered to mean "what all desire," there will be as many senses of good as there are of desire. And opposed to these goods will be different senses of evil. The chief distinction of desires is between rational desire, where an end is literally intended, and the appearance of desire whenever anything exerts any act. When any act is exerted, one object of real or apparent desire is the existence in act of the agent substance. Thus the existence of the substance is good to the substance either literally or in an analogous sense, depending on the kind of desire involved.

When the equivalent of desire is merely the determinism of nature compelling a being to pursue its existence through pursuing determinate objects, neither the existence nor the objects are literally good. And when the determinate being fails to exist as it "wants" because it fails in its pursuit of its objects, the failure is not literally evil. This failure is the apparent evil Thomas calls *malum naturae*.

A reasonable being is not determined to the acts whereby it exists, nor to the objects it pursues in these acts. If it were determined there would be no area in which it could exercise its reason. Reasonable beings select their objects and by the selection make them genuine goods. In this case failure to secure the objects, or even the lack of conditions required for securing them, is a real evil.

Using this notion of a real evil which befalls men, Thomas can lay the general principles for a critique of laws, societies and personal relationships; he can call these more or less good as they tend to increase or diminish human suffering. And from this notion that human suffering can be increased or diminished by human acts, Thomas can frame broad ethical principles under its sanction. These he calls the general laws dictated by reason to promote the common good.

Closely related to these laws is a second real evil. This is not the evil man suffers but the evil he does. Man is free to pursue goods unreasonably. This may take the form of increasing human suffering or it may simply be a matter of failing to consider the effects of an act. In either case, the reasonable being negates his reasonability. This differs from the plotinian refusal in that here the man is refusing the rule and is "living" his refusal by positing particular acts or particular intentional acts which are opposed to--or at least are settled upon without consideration of--the rule. But this refusal is very much like the plotinian notion of refusal in that no sufficient reason can be found for it; it stems directly from man's radical freedom.

Thomas makes a probing introspective analysis of a moral evil act, but the farther he goes in establishing causal connections, the farther the problem retreats. Thus passion, weakness, ignorance, external force--all the assignable causes that can help bring about an evil act--all serve to diminish the evil. Conversely, as causes diminish, malice and gravity increase. Thomas seems to fail to realize that his own analysis tends to establish not merely that we do not know the sufficient reason for evil but that there can not in principle be a sufficient reason for evil. If any doubt is left after his analysis of causal extenuating circumstances, the argument is conclusively established by the limiting case of the purest evil act

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conceivable--the sin of Satan. There were here no passions, no ignorance, no weakness; there was simply the decision to make himself like God, which Thomas explains as "he wanted to be his own rule." This is the rejection of reason in its purest form, no extenuating reasons can be assigned and the act is the purest form of evil.

The writer shares with Thomas the conclusion that moral evil stems from human freedom. Furthermore it seems that if the misfortunes that befall men are to be regarded as really evil, they too must be ascribed to this same cause of man's ability to act with no sufficient reason.

Take a case of a human victim--say the death of a child--and examine it from the standpoint of the victim. To do this one must love the victim. Now, if one tries to account for this event in terms of natural causality, one's love of the victim insists that the explanation is not sufficient; love insists that this reduces it to a merely apparent evil, while in fact, it is a real evil. To posit an evil god or an evil aspect of God as cause of it fails in the same way. To the lover, this is the same as positing no reason at all, for it would reduce the event to "just one of those things." In some cases an evil could be understood as an evening up of the score, but this does not apply here in the case of a child who, in our opinion, has not yet done wrong.

To find an explanation which will satisfy love one must refuse the natural explanation, the evil god explanation, the evil side of God explanation, and the view that there simply is no sufficient reason. One must say the causes were somehow free and responsible. But then love must admit that it alone is free. Love alone can be the cause of real evil. When love claims that what has befallen the beloved is really evil, love must at the same time admit that it is guilty, that its very freedom is the cause of evil.

Thomas seems to hold this view but he always posits as ground for it "the tradition of the faith" so it seems he does not consider it philosophically justifiable. Certainly it is rare that one can clearly draw the causal lines between one man's freedom and another's suffering; the principle is not, then, empirically evident. The only evidence for the principle is the fact that to deny that love causes evils means denying both love and evil; the love is suppressed as one refuses to take the victim's point of view and the evil collapses into mere catastrophe.

Plotinus rejects this view. He then must say there are no evils from the victim's viewpoint. The denial of love inevitably follows as when he characterizes "the death of a friend or of a child" as "nursery-terrors," and the denial of love is complete when he expresses contempt for all men who have failed to rescue themselves from their evil. And without love Plotinus cannot specify the characteristic act of soul. All he has is the austerely formal injunction that the ego dedicate itself--"by living," "by laying hold of" or "by making use of" a soul dedicated to the One. But he cannot find the specific acts involved in this living. And his inability to translate "living" into acts in the world makes it impossible for him to come to any conclusions on the conditions influencing the acts or the "living."

Although Leibniz speaks of love, it is not the love which can take the viewpoint of the victim. A love which can love only the beautiful or "that the contemplation of which is pleasant" simply cannot love a victim qua victim. But the love which recognizes evil must be able to put the lover in the place of the victim, to share the sufferings and the unpleasantness befalling him. Leibniz seems utterly unable to love with this love. This inability makes him unable to see, much less account for, the real evils. Critics from Voltaire to Russell seem to object more to this blindness than to the system Leibniz erected. The system, so far as it goes, is consistent, but then it is easy to account for mere metaphysical evil, and easy to explain moral and physical evil if they are only species of metaphysical evil. But the system finds evils merely apparent because it entirely omits love. And the omission of the fact of love undermines the entire system. Thus, not even in the case of man can Leibniz say that it is through love that a substance exerts its acts; there is then no need for an analogous sense of love through which other substances exert their acts. Every act then stems from substance because of what the substance essentially is. Existence is indistinguishable from essence and cannot be the object or the good of substance.

If Leibniz tries to introduce love at this point, the only possible objects for love are one's own substance or other substances. But other substances can be loved only as they are related to one's own apperception of one's own perfection. Leibniz derives his city of God from the notion that each substance will, in its own appropriate degree, love its superiors. But each superior is so only because it is the reason a priori for change in inferiors. Thus to each being the superior represents the source of the being's passivity, imperfection and (in conscious beings) pain. Correspondingly, one's inferiors and one's dominion over them represent one's perfection and one's joy. This is no hierarchy; it is a "pecking order" in a universal hen yard. Rather than City of God it sounds like traditional accounts of hell.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II

1 The fifty-four treatises of Plotinus were arranged in six groups of nine or *Enneads* by his disciple Porphyry. For each reference this dissertation will cite the *Ennead* number, the number of the treatise and the paragraph number. When the translation by Stephen Mackenna is used, citations will include "Mackenna" and the page number in the one-volume edition of the translation appearing as Volume 17 of the "Great Books of the Western World" series, Chicago, 1952. Where Mackenna is not cited, this writer is responsible for the translation from the Greek edition *Plotini Enneades, praemisso Porphyrii De Vita Plotini* etc., ed. Riccardus Volkmann, 2 vols., Leipzig 1883-1884. Wherever other editions or translations were used citations will so indicate. In all cases the writer has consulted the Greek and vouches for the translation's accuracy.

Here reference is made to Ennead V, treatise 1, paragraph 6; Mackenna p. 213.

2 *Ibid*.

3 *Ibid*.

4 *Ennead* V, 1, 7; Mackenna p. 212.

5 *Ennead* V, 1, 8; Mackenna p. 213.

6 Etienne Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers*, Toronto, 1949, p. 26.

7 *Ennead* V, 2, 1; Mackenna p. 213.

8 *Ennead* V, 1, 7; Mackenna p. 212.

9 *Ibid*.

10 *Ennead* V, 2, 2; Mackenna p. 215.

11 *Ennead* III, 2, 16; Mackenna p. 91.

12 *Ennead* II, 3, 7; Mackenna p. 44.

13 *Ennead* II, 2, 16-17; Mackenna pp. 48-49.

14 Ennead III, 3, 1; Volkmann II, p. 251.

15 Ennead III, 2, 16; Mackenna p. 91. Cf. Ennead III, 3, 1, for an example of this diversification.

16 Ennead III, 6, 19; Mackenna p. 118.

17 Ennead III, 2, 16; Mackenna p. 91.

18 Ennead IV, 3, 10; Mackenna p. 147.

19 Ennead III, 2, 4; Mackenna p. 84.

20 Ennead III, 2, 4; Mackenna p. 85.

21 Ennead III, 2, 2; Mackenna p. 83.

22 Ennead III, 3, 5; Mackenna p. 95.

23 Ennead III, 2, 8; Mackenna p. 87.

24 Ennead III, 1, 7; Mackenna p. 81.

25 Ennead V, 1, 10; Mackenna p. 213.

26 Ennead V, 1, 8; Mackenna p. 213.

27 Ennead VI, 9, 1; Mackenna p. 353.

28 Ennead V, 5, 5; Volkmann II, p. 212. Cf. Gilson, op. cit., p. 25.

29 Ennead VI, 1, 8; Mackenna pp. 212-213.

30 Ennead VI, 7, 38; Mackenna p. 340. Cf. T. Whittaker, The Neo-Platonists, Cambridge, 1918, p. 58 and Gilson, op. cit., p. 21.

31 Ennead I, 8, 2; Mackenna p. 27.

32 Ennead V, 5, 9; Volkmann II, p. 217.

33 Ennead I, 8, 3; Volkmann I, p. 102.

34 Ennead I, 8, 7; Mackenna p. 30.

35 Ennead III, 2, 5; Mackenna p. 85.

36 B. A. G. Fuller, The Problem of Evil in Plotinus, Cambridge, 1912, pp. 103-107.

37 Fuller, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

38 *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.

39 *Ennead* I, 8, 5; Mackenna p. 29.

40 *Ennead* I, 8, 10-11;--or, as Mackenna has it, 10--Mackenna, p. 32.

41 *Ennead* II, 9, 17; Mackenna p. 77.

42 Emile Brehier, *Plotin Enneades, texte et traduction*, Paris, 1924-1938, Tome I, p. III.

43 A. H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus*, Cambridge, England, 1940, pp. 86-87.

44 *Ibid.*, p. 89.

45 William R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, London and New York, 1929, I, p. 133, Cf. Inge's Article, "Neo-Platonism," in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Edinburgh, IX, p. 130.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 260.

47 *Ibid.*, pp. 259-60.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 258.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 257.

50 *Ibid.*, p. 133.

51 George Santayana, "Plotinus and the Nature of Evil: review of B. A. G. Fuller's *The Problem of Evil in Plotinus*," in *Obiter Scripta*, New York, 1936, pp. 77-78.

52 *Ennead*, I, 6, 7; Mackenna, p. 24.

53 *Ennead*, VI, 7, 31; Mackenna, p. 337.

54 *Ennead* III, 5, 1; Mackenna p. 101.

55 *Ennead* V, 8, 8; Mackenna p. 243.

56 *Ennead* II, 9, 13; Mackenna p. 73.

57 Fuller, op. cit., p. 107.

58 Ennead II, 5, 5; Volkmann I, p. 172.

59 Ennead VI, 8, 26.

60 Ennead II, 4, 3; Volkmann I, p. 152. Cf. Mackenna p. 50.

61 Ennead II, 4, 15; Volkmann I, p. 165.

62 Ennead III, 6, 11; Mackenna p. 113.

63 Ennead III, 1, 7-10; Mackenna pp. 81-82.

64 Ennead VI, 8, 7; Mackenna p. 345.

65 Ennead VI, 8, 4; Mackenna p. 344.

66 Ennead I, 8, 5; Mackenna p. 29.

67 Ennead I, 8, 11--or, as Mackenna has it, 10--Mackenna p. 32.

68 Ennead III, 2, 18; Mackenna p. 92.

69 Ennead IV, 3, 15; Mackenna p. 150.

70 Ibid.

71 Ennead IV, 3, 8; Mackenna p. 145.

72 Ennead II, 3, 10; Mackenna p. 46.

73 Ennead I, 8, 8; Mackenna p. 31.

74 Ennead III, 4, 5; Mackenna p. 99.

75 Ennead IV, 3, 13; Mackenna p. 149.

76 Ennead IV, 3, 8; Mackenna pp. 145-146.

77 Ennead I, 1, 7; Mackenna pp. 3-4.

78 Ennead I, 1, 7; Mackenna p. 4.

79 Ennead I, 1, 8; Mackenna p. 4.

80 Ennead I, 1, 9; Mackenna p. 4.

81 Ennead I, 1, 10; Mackenna, p. 5.

82 Ennead I, 1, 11; Mackenna p. 5.

83 Ennead I, 1, 9; Mackenna p. 4.

84 Ennead I, 1, 12; Mackenna p. 5.

85 Ennead III, 2, 18; Mackenna p. 92.

86 Ennead III, 3, 3; Mackenna p. 94.

87 Ennead III, 3, 3-4; Mackenna pp. 93-95.

88 Ennead III, 4, 2-3; Mackenna pp. 97-98.

89 Ennead III, 2, 8; Mackenna p. 86.

90 Ennead III, 1, 4; Mackenna p. 80.

91 Ennead III, 2, 7; Mackenna p. 86.

92 Ennead III, 3, 5; Mackenna p. 96.

93 Ennead I, 8, 11--or, as Mackenna has it, 12--Mackenna p. 32.

94 Ennead I, 1, 12; Mackenna p. 5.

95 Bruno Switalski, Plotinus and the Ethics of St. Augustine, Chicago, 1946, p. 60.

96 Ennead II, 3, 9; Mackenna p. 45.

97 Ennead I, 1, 9-11; Mackenna pp. 4-5.

98 Ennead III, 3, 4; Mackenna p. 95.

99 Ennead III, 4, 6; Volkmann II, p. 258.

100 Ennead IV, 8, 2; Mackenna p. 201.

101 Ennead IV, 3, 8; Mackenna p. 146.

102 Ennead I, 2, 4; Mackenna p. 8.

103 Ennead I, 7, 3; Mackenna p. 27.

104 Ennead VI, 8, 5-6; Mackenna pp. 344-345.

105 Ennead III, 2, 18; Volkmann II, p. 250.

106 Ennead IV, 3, 6; Mackenna p. 145.

107 Ennead II, 3, 15; Volkmann I, p. 146.

108 Ennead III, 1, 9; Mackenna p. 82.

109 Ennead IV, 4, 44; Mackenna pp. 181-182.

110 Ennead II, 3, 9; Mackenna p. 45.

111 Ennead II, 3, 13; Volkmann I, p. 143.

112 Ennead IV, 3, 15; Mackenna p. 150.

113 Ibid.

114 Ennead IV, 4, 34; Mackenna p. 176.

115 Ennead II, 9.

116 Ennead I, 8, 6; Mackenna p. 29.

117 Ennead I, 4, 6; Mackenna p. 15.

118 Ennead I, 2, 5; Mackenna p. 8.

119 Ennead IV, 4, 44; Mackenna p. 182.

120 Ennead I, 2, 1; Mackenna p. 6.

121 Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, I, p. 254.

122 Ennead VI, 8, 26; Mackenna p. 334.

123 Ennead V, 1, 1; Mackenna p. 208.

124 Ennead V, 3, 9; Mackenna p. 221.

125 Ennead I, 3.

126 Ennead I, 3, 6; Mackenna p. 12.

127 Ennead I, 2, 7; Volkmann I, p. 57.

128 Ennead I, 1, 12; Mackenna p. 6.

129 Ennead I, 3, 6; Mackenna p. 12.

130 Ennead I, 2, 2; Mackenna p. 7.

131 Ennead I, 2, 3; Volkmann I, p. 53.

132 Ennead I, 2, 6; Volkmann I, p. 56.

133 Ennead I, 2, 6; Mackenna p. 9.

134 Cf. Ennead I, 2, 7; Mackenna p. 9.

135 Ennead I, 2, 7; Mackenna p. 10.

136 Ennead I, 3, 4; Mackenna p. 11.

137 Ennead IV, 4, 44; Mackenna p. 181.

138 Ennead I, 4, 4; Mackenna p. 14.

139 Ennead II, 9, 9; Mackenna p. 70.

140 Ennead III, 2, 8; Mackenna p. 86.

141 Ennead III, 2, 8-9; Mackenna p. 87.

142 Ennead I, 4, 4; Mackenna p. 14.

143 Ennead IV, 4, 17; Mackenna p. 166.

144 Ennead III, 1, 9-10; Mackenna p. 82.

145 Ennead II, 3, 9; Mackenna p. 45.

146 Ennead VI, 8, 2; Mackenna p. 343.

147 Ennead VI, 8, 3; Mackenna p. 344.

148 Ennead II, 3, 13; Volkmann I, p. 143.

149 Ennead IV, 4, 17; Mackenna p. 166; Cf. Ennead IV, 4, 44; Mackenna pp. 181-182.

150 Ennead III, 9, 2, part 2; Volkmann I, p. 348.

151 Ennead I, 8, 4; Volkmann I, p. 102; numbers not in the original. Cf. Mackenna p. 28, where this last "practice" is translated as "to name things good or evil not by their true value but by the mere test of like and dislike."

152 *Ennead* III, 6, 11; Mackenna p. 113.

153 *Ennead* III, 6, 13; Mackenna p. 115.

154 *Ennead* III, 6, 14; Mackenna p. 115.

155 *Ennead* V, 9, 10; Mackenna p. 250.

156 *Ennead* I, 8, 4; Volkmann I, p. 103.

157 *Ennead* I, 8, 13--or, as Mackenna has it, 10--Mackenna p. 32.

158 *Ennead* III, 2, 15; Mackenna p. 90. Cf. B. A. G. Fuller, *The Problem of Evil in Plotinus*, p. 157.

159 *Ennead* VI, 7, 26; Mackenna p. 334.

160 *Ennead* I, 4, 6; Mackenna p. 15. Cf. *Ennead* IV, 4, 44; Mackenna pp. 181-182.

161 *Ennead* VI, 8, 3; Mackenna p. 344.

162 *Ennead* I, 1, 10; Mackenna p. 5.

163 *Ennead* IV, 4, 17; Mackenna p. 166.

164 *Ennead* I, 4, 6; Mackenna p. 15.

165 *Ennead* I, 8, 4; Mackenna p. 28.

166 *Ennead* I, 4, 15; Mackenna p. 18.

167 *Ennead* I, 4, 4; Mackenna p. 14.

168 *Ennead* I, 4, 5-7; Mackenna pp. 14-15.

169 *Ennead* I, 4, 7-13; Mackenna pp. 15-16.

170 *Ennead* I, 4, 8; Mackenna p. 16.

171 *Ennead* I, 4, 6; Mackenna p. 15.

172 *Ennead* I, 4, 14; Mackenna p. 18.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER III

1 Saint Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, I, 1.

2 Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Quodlibetales*, II, 3.

3 Saint Thomas Aquinas, *In I Boethius de Hebdomadibus*, Lecture 2.

4 Saint Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Question 5, Article 1. (abbreviated *S. T.* I, Q 5, a 1). Cf. Thomas' *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 20. (abbreviated *C. G.*, III, 20)

5 *C. G.*, III, 20.

6 *S. T.*, I, Q 105, a 5.

7 *Ibid*.

8 *C. G.*, III, 113.

9 *S. T.*, I, Q 65, a 2.

10 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 1, 1094a 3.

11 *S. T.*, I, Q 5, a 1.

12 *C. G.*, I, 28.

13 *S. T.*, I, Q 48, a 1.

14 *S. T.*, I, Q 5, a 1. Cf. *C. G.*, III, 20.

15 Étienne Gilson, *Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, New York, 1949, p. 366.

16 *S. T.*, I-II, Q 12, a 1.

17 *Ibid.*, I, Q 19, a 4.

18 *C. G.*, III, 109. Cf. *Ibid.*, 111.

19 *Ibid.*, III, 2.

20 Ibid.

21 S. T., I-II, Q 6, a 2.

22 Ibid.

23 C. G., III, 111. Cf. Ibid., 110 and S. T., I-II, Q 12, a 5.

24 S. T., I-II, Q 6, a 2.

25 Thomas, De Malo, Q 1, a 4.

26 C. G., III, 107, Cf. Ibid., 26; S. T., I-II, Q 10, a 1.

27 Ibid.

28 S. T., I-II, Q 13, a 2.

29 S. T., I, Q 48, a 1.

30 Ibid., Q 48, a 3.

31 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV, 2, 1004a 15.

32 S. T., I, Q 48, a 3, ad 2.

33 C. G., III, 7.

34 Ibid., 6. Cf. S. T., I, Q 49, a 2.

35 S. T., I, Q 48, a 5, ad 1.

36 Ibid., a 5.

37 Ibid., Q 49, a 1, ad 3.

38 Ibid., a 2.

39 C. G., III, 10.

40 S. T., I, Q 48, a 5.

41 De Malo, Q 1, a 4.

42 C. G., III, 85.

43 S. T., I-II, Q 9, a 1.

44 C. G., III, 85.

45 S. T., I-II, Q 71, a 6.

46 Ibid., ad 5.

47 Ibid., Q 19, a 3.

48 S. T., I, Q 49, a 1, ad 3.

49 S. T., I-II, Q 75, corpus and ad 3.

50 C. G., III, 10.

51 Jacques Maritain, St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil, Milwaukee, 1945, pp. 27-28.

52 De Malo, Q 1, a 3.

53 C. G., III, 109.

54 S. T., I-II, Q 21, a 3.

55 S. T., I, Q 49, a 2.

56 De Malo, Q 1, a 1, ad 1.

57 S. T., I, Q 48, a 5, ad 1; and S. T., I-II, Q 85, a 6.

58 De Malo, Q 1, a 4. Cf. S. T., I, Q 48, a 5, and C. G., III, 6.

59 S. T., I-II, Q 85, a 5, ad 1.

60 De Malo, Q 1, a 4.

61 Ibid., Q 5, a 4.

62 S. T., I-II, Q 85, a 5, ad 1.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid., Q 87, a 7, ad 1.

65 De Malo, Q 5, a 4.

66 S. T., I, Q 48, a 5.

67 S. T., I, Q 48, a 6; S. T., II-II, Q 76, a 4; De Malo, Q 1, a 5; In II Sent., distinctio 37, a 2.

68 S. T., I-II, Q 74, a 9.

69 Ibid., Q 94, a 2.

70 De Malo, Q 2, a 2.

71 C. G., III, 10.

72 S. T., I-II, Q 6.

73 Ibid. and De Malo, Q 2, a 1.

74 S. T., I-II, Q 18, a 3.

75 De Malo, Q 1, a 3.

76 Ibid., Q 2, a 4.

77 Ibid., Q 4, a 1; a 6; a 7; a 8.

FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1 G. W. Leibniz, "Observations on The Book Concerning '*The Origin of Evil*,' Published Recently in London," tr. E. M. Huggard as appendix to *Theodicy*, New Haven, 1952, p. 419. (All *Theodicy* citations refer to this edition.)

2 G. W. Leibniz, "Reflections on The Doctrine of a Single Universal Spirit," *Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters*, tr. Leroy E. Loemker, Chicago, 1956, p. 908. Cf. also "Principles of Nature and of Grace," Secs. 2-3, Loemker's *Papers*, p. 1034.

3 Leibniz, "Letter to De Volder, January 21, 1704," *Papers*, p. 869.

4 Leibniz, "On Nature Itself," Sec. 9, *Papers*, p. 816.

5 *Ibid.*, Sec. 8, p. 815. Cf. "On Transsubstantiation," IV, 31, *Papers*, p. 182.

6 Leibniz, "Letter to De Volder, January 21, 1704," *Papers*, p. 870.

7 Leibniz, "Letter to Basnage," n.d., cited in *A History of Modern Philosophy*, Harald Hoffding, London, 1935, p. 345.

8 Leibniz, *Theodicy*, Sec. 32, p. 142.

9 Leibniz, "Letter to Arnauld," cited by Hoffding, p. 347.

10 Leibniz, "A New System of the Nature and the Communication of Substances, As Well As the Union Between The Soul and The Body," Sec. 3, *Papers*, p. 741.

11 Leibniz, "Monadology," Sec. 17, *Papers*, p. 1046. Cf. "Discourse on Metaphysics," Sec. 14, *Papers*, p. 480; "The Principles of Nature and of Grace, Based on Reason," Sec. 2, *Papers*, p. 1034; "Reflections on the Doctrine of a Single Universal Spirit," *Papers*, p. 908.

12 Leibniz, "Specimen Dynamicum," *Papers*, p. 733. Cf. *Theodicy*, Sec. 66, p. 159; "First Truths," *Papers*, p. 415.

13 Leibniz, "Letter to De Volder, June 20, 1703," *Papers*, p. 859.

14 Leibniz, "Monadology," Sec. 50, *Papers*, p. 1052.

15 Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Sec. 14, *Papers*, p. 480.

16 *Ibid*., Secs. 14-15, *Papers*, pp. 480-481.

17 Leibniz, "Monadology," Secs. 49-50, *Papers*, p. 1052.

18 Leibniz, "Letter to De Volder, January 20, 1704," *Papers*, p. 870.

19 Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Sec. 14, *Papers*, p. 480; Secs. 28-30, *Papers*, p. 495.

20 *Ibid*.

21 Leibniz, "Monadology," Sec. 56, *Papers*, p. 1053. Cf. "The Principles of Nature and of Grace," Sec. 3, *Papers*, p. 1035.

22 Leibniz, a short paper identified only as Gerhardt VII, pp. 108-111, cited by Bertrand Russell, *Philosophy of Leibniz*, Cambridge, England, 1900, pp. 193-194, footnote.

23 Leibniz, "On the Radical Origination of Things," *Papers*, p. 790.

24 Leibniz, cited by Russell, *op*. *cit*., pp. 193-194.

25 Leibniz, "On Freedom," *Papers*, p. 405.

26 This point recurs so frequently that we shall list only a few of the more explicit passages. In "Monadology" Leibniz refers (Secs. 53-55) to fourteen additional passages of the *Theodicy* which we exclude on grounds that they are too oblique. "Monadology," Secs. 53-55, *Papers*, p. 1053; "Principles of Nature and of Grace," Sec. 10, *Papers*, p. 1039; "Discourse on Metaphysics," Sec. 6, *Papers*, p. 470; *Theodicy*, Secs. 8-10, pp. 128-129; *Ibid*., Sec. 78, p. 164; *Ibid*., Sec. 84, p. 168; *Ibid*., Secs. 116-119, pp. 187-191; *Ibid*., Secs. 204-208, pp. 254-257.

27 Loemker, *Papers*, p. 47.

28 Leibniz, "On the Ultimate Origination of Things," tr. Robert Latta, *Leibniz: The Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings*, Oxford, 1898, p. 339.

29 Leibniz, *Theodicy*, Sec. 78, p. 164.

30 *Ibid*., Sec. 201, p. 253.

31 *Ibid*., Sec. 8, p. 128.

32 Leibniz, "On the Radical Origination of Things," *Papers*, p. 792. Cf. Latta, *op. cit*., p. 341.

33 Leibniz, "On the Radical Origination of Things," *Papers*, p. 792.

34 Bertrand Russell, *A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz*, p. 296.

35 Leibniz, "Dialogue Between Polidore and Theophile," *Papers*, p. 335.

36 Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Sec. 5, *Papers*, p. 469.

37 Leibniz, "On the Radical Origination of Things," *Papers*, p. 795.

38 Leibniz, *Theodicy*, Sec. 194, p. 248.

39 *Ibid*., Sec. 79, p. 118.

40 *Ibid*., Sec. 10, p. 129. Cf. "Reply to the Thoughts on the System of Preestablished Harmony Contained in the Second Edition of Mr. Bayle's Critical Dictionary, Article Rorarius," *Papers*, p. 948.

41 Leibniz, "On Transsubstantiation," I, 1-2, *Papers*, p. 178.

42 Leibniz, "On Nature Itself," Sec. 2, 8-11, *Papers*, pp. 815-817.

43 Wilhelm Windelband, *A History of Philosophy*, tr. H. Tufts, New York, 1893, p. 507.

44 Leibniz, "Letter to De Volder, January 21, 1704," *Papers*, p. 870.

45 Leibniz, "Letter to Basnage," Höffding, *op*. *cit*., p. 345.

46 Leibniz, *Monadology*, Sec. 79, *Papers*, p. 1058.

47 Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Sec. 30, *Papers*, p. 496.

48 Leibniz, *Monadology*, Sec. 84, *Papers*, p. 1059.

49 Leibniz, *Theodicy*, Sec. 396, cited by Herbert Weldon Carr, *The Monadology of Leibniz*, Los Angeles, 1930, p. 46.

50 Leibniz, *Theodicy*, Sec. 167, p. 228.

51 Leibniz, "On Freedom," *Papers*, p. 408.

52 Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," Sec. 30, *Papers*, p. 497.

53 Leibniz, *Theodicy*, Sec. 20, p. 135.

54 Russell, *op*. *cit*., p. 198.

55 Leibniz, *Theodicy*, Secs. 377-394, pp. 351-360.

56 Leibniz, *Theodicy*, Secs. 409-417, pp. 367-373.

57 Leibniz, "Letter to Magnus Wedderkopf, May, 1671," *Papers*, pp. 226-227.

58 Russell, *op*. *cit*., p. 199.

59 Leibniz, *Theodicy*, Sec. 21, p. 136.

60 Leibniz, "On the Radical Origination of Things," *Papers*, p. 795. Cf. *Theodicy*, Sec. 106, p. 181.

61 Leibniz, "Dialogue Between Polidore and Theophile," *Papers*, p. 335.

62 Leibniz, "Selections from the Paris Notes, Note of February 11, 1676," *Papers*, p. 247. Cf. "*Tentamen Anagogicum*," *Papers*, p. 780; *Monadology*, Sec. 60, Carr, *op*. *cit*., p. 103.

63 Leibniz, "Letter to Magnus Wedderkopf, May 1671," *Papers*, p. 228.

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64 Loemker, *Papers*, p. 91.

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66 Spinoza, *Ethics*, ed. J. Gutmann, New York, 1949, p. 235.

67 Russell, *op*. *cit*., p. 197.

68 R. W. Meyer, *Leibniz and the Seventeenth Century Revolution*, tr. J. P. Stern, Chicago, 1952, p. 161.

69 H. W. B. Joseph, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Leibniz*, Oxford, 1949, p. 188.

70 Cf. Carr, *op*. *cit*., p. 43.

71 Carr, *op*. *cit*., p. 97.

72 Russell, *op*. *cit*., p. 197.

73 Höffding, *op*. *cit*., p. 364.

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